Saturday, October 16, 2010

JOINT PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM CONCERNING CLAIM OF MR. AUGUSTIN AND THE DEBTORS’



$21,802,092.26 (million) Civil Conspiracy Trial (#:07-10416 KJC) set for 10-20-10 at US Bankruptcy Court of Delaware, http://bit.ly/T-2010

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In re: : Chapter 11
:
NEW CENTURY TRS HOLDINGS, : Case No. 07-10416 (KJC)
INC., a Delaware corporation, et al., 1 :
: Jointly Administered
Debtors. :


JOINT PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
CLAIM OF MR. AUGUSTIN AND THE DEBTORS’
EIGHTEENTH OMNIBUS OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS

Consistent with this Court’s General Order regarding pre-trial procedures for matters set for trial, The New Century Liquidating Trust (the “Trust”) and Pierre Augustin, who identifies himself in this proceeding as Private Attorney General, Ex Rel (“Mr. Augustin”), respectfully submit this Joint Pre-Trial Memorandum. Counsel for the Trust circulated a draft of this memorandum to Mr. Augustin, who is representing himself in this matter, on October 8, 2010. On October 14, 2010, Mr. Augustin provided counsel for the Trust with his comments to the draft. Thereafter, the parties have worked together to arrive at this mutually agreeable form of memorandum.

BASIS OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).

By filing a proof of claim with this Court, Mr. Augustin submitted himself to the equitable jurisdiction of this Court to determine his asserted claim against New Century Mortgage Corporation (“NCMC”), one of the above-captioned debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”).

STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS
General Case Background
On April 2, 2007 (the “Petition Date”), the above-captioned debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) (with the exception of New Century Warehouse Corporation) filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) with this Court. Until the Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of the Debtors and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Dated as of April 23, 2008 (the “Original Plan”)2 became effective on August 1, 2008, the Debtors continued in the management and operation of their businesses pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sections 1107 and 1108.

On April 23, 2008, the Debtors filed the Original Plan [D.I. 6412].3
On July 15, 2008, the Court entered the order confirming the Original Plan [D.I. 8596] (the “Original Confirmation Order”). The order amending the Original Confirmation Order was entered on July 22, 2008.

On August 1, 2008 (the “Original Effective Date”), the Original Plan became effective. Pursuant to the terms of the Original Plan, on the Original Effective Date the New Century Liquidating Trust Agreement (the “Trust Agreement”) was executed, thereby creating the Trust and appointing Alan M. Jacobs as Trustee of the Trust. On the Original Effective Date, among other things, all Assets of the Debtors (excluding Access Lending Assets but including Access Lending Interests) were distributed to the Trust and all of the remaining members of the Debtors ’ Board of Directors and Officers ceased to serve in those capacities by operation of the Original Confirmation Order.

On August 4, 2008, the Notice of (I) Entry of Order Confirming Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation of the Debtors and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Dated as of April 23, 2008 (II) Effective Date and (III) Bar Dates for Administrative Claims, Professional Fee Claims, Subordination Statements, and Rejection Damage Claims [D.I. 8705] (the “Notice of Effective Date”) was filed.
On June 16, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (the “District Court”) issued a Memorandum Opinion and an order reversing the Original Confirmation Order (together, the “Order Reversing Confirmation”).
On September 30, 2009, the Trustee filed the Modified Plan [D.I. 9905].
On November 20, 2009, the Court entered an order confirming the Modified Plan (the “Modified Confirmation Order”) [D.I. 9957].

On December 1, 2009 (the “Modified Effective Date”), the Modified Plan became effective. On the Modified Effective Date, the Modified Plan, inter alia, (a) confirmed that all actions taken by the Trustee subsequent to the Original Effective Date were valid and binding, (b) adopted, ratified and confirmed the formation of the Trust as of the Original Effective Date, (c) adopted, ratified and confirmed the Liquidating Trust Agreement as of the Original Effective Date, and (d) adopted, ratified and confirmed the appointment of Alan M. Jacobs as Trustee as of the Original Effective Date.

Pursuant to Section 3.3. of the Trust Agreement and the Modified Confirmation Order, as of the Original Effective Date, the Trust reserved the exclusive right to object to the allowance of any claim, and the Trustee was given the authority and power to file objections regarding the allowance and disallowance of claims.

Facts Specific To Procedural Posture
On or about January 8, 2008, Mr. Augustin filed two proofs of claim against NCMC, claim numbers 3781 and 3759, which were identical. Each proof of claim asserted a claim amount of $700,264.80 plus punitive damages in an unknown amount on the basis of civil conspiracy of mortgage fraud.

On February 22, 2008, the Debtors filed the Debtors’ Fifteenth Omnibus Objection to Claims: Non-Substantive Objection Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 502, 503, 506 and 507, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 9014, and Del. Bankr. L.R. 3007-1 to Certain (A) Amended and Superseded Claims; (B) Duplicate Claims; (C) Late Filed Claims; and (D) No Supporting Documentation Claims [D.I. 5024] (the “Fifteenth Omnibus Objection”). The Fifteenth Omnibus Objection sought to expunge, among other claims, claims that were duplicative of other claims filed against the Debtors. Claim number 3781 (the “Duplicate Claim”) filed by Mr. Augustin was one of the claims that the Debtors sought to expunge in the Fifteenth Omnibus Objection.

On March 27, 2008, the Debtors filed the Debtors’ Eighteenth Omnibus Objection: Substantive Objection Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 502, 503, 506 and 507, Bankruptcy Rules 3007 and 9014, and Local Rule 3007-1 to Certain (A) Books and Records Claims; (B) Insufficient Documentation Claims; (C) Multiple-Debtor Duplicate Claims; and (D) Reduced and/or Reclassified Claims [D.I. 5537] (the “Eighteenth Omnibus Objection”). The Eighteenth Omnibus Objection sought to expunge, among other claims, claims that were not reflected in the Debtors’ books and records and that had insufficient documentation to support them. Claim number 3759 (the “Remaining Claim”) filed by Mr. Augustin was one of the claims that the Debtors sought to expunge in the Eighteenth Omnibus Objection.

Once the Original Plan became effective, the Trust assumed prosecution of the Debtors’ unresolved claim objections, including the Fifteenth Omnibus Objection and the Eighteenth Omnibus Objection.

Mr. Augustin consented to the relief requested in the Fifteenth Omnibus Objection as it relates to the Duplicate Claim (i.e., expunging the Duplicate Claim).

On January 21, 2009, the Court heard argument of counsel for the Trust and Mr. Augustin regarding the priority of the Remaining Claim. The Court determined that there was no legal basis for the asserted priority of the Remaining Claim.

On January 29, 2009, the Court entered an order expunging the Duplicate Claim, reclassifying the Remaining Claim as a general unsecured claim, and expressly providing that nothing in the order is meant to preclude any claim of rescission that Mr. Augustin may have [D.I. 9323]. Mr. Augustin has not filed anything to amend the Remaining Claim. Tr. 12:14-17.4

Accordingly, the Remaining Claim, claim no. 3759, asserting a claim amount of $700,264.80 plus punitive damages in an unknown amount on the basis of civil conspiracy of mortgage fraud, is the focus of the dispute presently before the Court.

Discovery Schedule and Disputes
On September 4, 2008, the Court issued a scheduling order regarding the objections to the Mr. Augustin’s claims [D.I. 8905] (the “Scheduling Order”). Fact discovery was scheduled to close on December 19, 2008.

On February 11, 2009, Mr. Augustin filed his Motion to Compel New Century Liquidating Trust to Produce Original Front & Back of Mortgage Note [D.I. 9332] (“Motion to Compel Production of Original Note”) and the Trust filed its objection to Motion to Compel Production of Original Note on March 23, 2009 [D.I. 9403]. The Trust subsequently represented to the Court that it is not in possession of the original mortgage note, as the note was sold and the original note was given to the subsequent mortgage holder.

On March 10, 2009, the Trust filed its Motion to Compel Discovery from Pierre Augustin and Extend the Discovery Deadline [D.I. 9373] (the “Trust Motion to Compel”).

On March 23, 2009, Mr. Augustin filed his (I) Petition to Withdraw All Submitted Answers to Request for Admission Pending the Outcome of Consumer Creditor’s Private (Non-Judicial) Administrative Process Per UCC and Discoveries of Non-Parties Party Witnesses & Judicial Cognizance of Rescission of Signature Except on the Promissory Note and (II) Objections & Rebuttal to Motion to Compel [D.I. 9426].

On March 26, 2009, the Court held a hearing regarding, inter alia, the Motion to Compel Production of Original Note. The Court denied the Motion to Compel Production of Original Note and ordered counsel for the Trust to submit a form of order denying the motion.

On April 6, 2009, Mr. Augustin filed his Emergency Petition for Reconsideration of Denying in Part the Request for Providing Original Note with Wet Ink Signature for Authentic Proof [D.I. 9575].

On April 14, 2009, the Court entered its Order Regarding (1) Motion of Pierre Augustin to Compel New Century Liquidating Trust to Produce Original Front & Back of Mortgage Note, (2) Motion of the New Century Liquidating Trust to Compel Discovery From Pierre Augustin and Extend Discovery Deadlines, and (3) Amended Scheduling Order [D.I. 9587] (the “First Discovery Ruling”), which, among other things, denied the Motion to Compel Production of Original Note and revised the scheduling order, allowing certain additional discovery by Mr. Augustin to be answered by the Trust on May 13, 2009.

On April 24, 2009, Mr. Augustin simultaneously filed a (i) Notice of Appeal, regarding the First Discovery Ruling [D.I. 9602] (the “First Discovery Appeal”), and (ii) Petition for A Stay of Discovery Matters Pending the Outcome of an Emergency Writ to the Higher Courts [D.I. 9603] (the “Petition to Stay Discovery”).
On April 30, 2009, the Clerk of this Court filed the Notice of Hearing on the Petition For A Stay Of Discovery Matters [D.I. 9612].

The Trust served its responses to Mr. Augustin’s additional discovery requests (the “Trust’s Discovery Responses”) on May 13, 2009. On that same date, the Trust filed a Notice of Service indicating its service of the Trust’s Discovery Responses [D.I. 9640].

On May 20, 2009, the Trust filed the Objection Of The New Century Liquidating Trust To Petition For A Stay Of Discovery Matters Pending The Outcome Of An Emergency Writ To The Higher Courts [D.I. 9650].

On May 27, 2009, the Court held a hearing regarding, inter alia, Mr. Augustin’s Petition to Stay Discovery. Subsequent to the hearing, on May 29, 2009, a Notice of Docketing Record on Appeal to the District Court was filed [D.I. 9668].

The District Court assigned Case No. 09-378-SLR to the First Discovery Appeal.
On June 24, 2009, the Trust filed the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss the Appeal (the “Motion to Dismiss First Discovery Appeal”) [D.C. D.I. 3]5 and brief in support thereof [D.C. D.I. 4]. The District Court granted the Motion to Dismiss First Discovery Appeal by order entered on March 24, 2010 [D.C. D.I. 10].

On or about July 17, 2009, Pierre Augustin filed his Emergency Request to Obtain Information From the Compel Order for the Trust to Answer the Questions Except the Production of the Promissory Note [D.I. 9736] (“July Motion to Compel”).

On July 24, 2009, the Trust filed its Motion of New Century Liquidating Trust for an Order Extending Time to Complete Deposition Discovery Concerning Claim Dispute With Pierre Augustin [D.I. 9749] (“Trust Motion to Extend Time”).

On or about August 3, 2009, Mr. Augustin filed his Objections to Trust Discovery Responses & Emergency Motion to Compel Revised Answers & Production of Documents to Discovery Questions & Judicial Notice of Modern Money Mechanics Publication [D.I. 9757] (“August Motion to Compel”). The August Motion to Compel also included Objections to Notice of Deposition (FRCP 30), which was effectively a motion to quash to the Trust’s notices of deposition. The Trust viewed the July Motion to Compel as moot, as the August Motion to Compel acknowledged that Mr. Augustin had received the Trust’s Discovery Responses.

On August 18, 2009, the Trust filed its Motion of New Century Liquidating Trust to Compel Pierre Augustin to Respond to Certain Discovery Requests [D.I. 9835] (“Trust Motion to Compel”). On that same date, the Trust objected to the August Motion to Compel [D.I. 9837) and responded to the Objections to Notice of Deposition [D.I. 9838].

On August 21, 2009, the Court held a telephonic hearing to address the various discovery disputes by and among the Trust and Mr. Augustin. At the hearing, the Court adjudicated the July Motion to Compel, the August Motion to Compel, the Trust Motion to Extend Time, and the Trust Motion to Compel.

At the conclusion of the August 21, 2009 telephonic hearing, the Court directed counsel for the Trust to submit a proposed form of order under certification of counsel denying the July Motion to Compel and the August Motion to Compel.
On August 21, 2009, the Court entered an order granting the relief requested in the Trust Motion to Compel [D.I. 9840] and an order granting the relief requested in the Trust Motion to Extend Time [D.I. 9841].

On August 31, 2009, the Court entered an order [D.I. 9867] (the “Second Discovery Ruling”) denying the July Motion to Compel and the August Motion to Compel. Additionally, the Second Discovery Ruling stated that “to the extent that the August Motion to Compel included any additional discovery requests from Mr. Augustin directed to the Trust, such additional discovery requests are hereby quashed as untimely.” And finally, the Second Discovery Ruling required the Trust to re-serve the Trust’s Discovery Responses upon Mr. Augustin.

On September 9, 2009, Mr. Augustin filed an Emergency Notice of Appeal regarding the Second Discovery Ruling (the “Second Discovery Appeal”) [D.I. 9875].

The District Court assigned Case No. 09-732-SLR to the Second Discovery Appeal.
On November 25, 2009, the Trust filed the Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal (the “Motion to Dismiss Second Discovery Appeal”) [D.C. D.I. 5] and brief in support thereof [D.C. D.I. 6]. The District Court granted the Motion to Dismiss Second Discovery Appeal by order entered on July 15, 2010 [D.C. D.I. 11].

Facts Specific To Claim Dispute
Mr. Augustin has a Bachelor’s of Science degree in political science, business, and economics from Salem State College. Tr. 10:5-7. He received a Masters in Public Administration from Suffolk University and, in 1999, a Master’s in Business Administration from the University of Lowell. Tr. 10:13-17; Tr. 207:6-7.

On or about May 17, 2002, Danversbank (f/k/a Danvers Savings Bank) issued an alleged small business loan to Mr. Augustin’s business, in the approximate amount of $55,000 (the alleged “Danvers Loan”), to enable Mr. Augustin’s business to export products to Haiti. Complaint (defined below), ¶ 37 and 43; Tr. 199:1 – 201:6. On May 17, 2002, Mr. Augustin executed an Unconditional Personal Guaranty in connection with the alleged Danvers Loan. Complaint, Exhibit 7.

Mr. Augustin asserts that due to the political and economic climate in Haiti, the retail operations of his business in Haiti suffered, rendering his business unable to make payments due under the alleged Danvers Loan, ultimately resulting in Mr. Augustin personally filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy to protect his home and to eliminate all unsecured debts. Complaint, ¶ 45-48.

On December 18, 2003, Ms. Ngampa executed a Massachusetts Mortgage Broker Disclosure with Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp. (“Allied”), that states that Allied is not her agent. Further, on December 18, 2003, Ms. Ngampa executed a Massachusetts High Cost Loan Application Disclosure provided by Allied, that states: “The alleged loan which will be offered to you is not necessarily the least expensive alleged loan available to you and you are advised to shop around to determine competitive interest rates, points, and other fees and charges.”

On January 22, 2004, NCMC received an alleged loan application from a broker, Allied, in connection with an alleged loan sought by Mr. Augustin and Briget Ngampa (“Ms. Ngampa”), Mr. Augustin’s wife. NCMC denied this application and issued a letter to the same effect on February 24, 2004. Tr. 65:13-22. Mr. Augustin asserts that when he received the denial letter, it was the first time that Mr. Augustin had heard of NCMC. Tr. 75:6-8.

By letter dated March 17, 2004, in connection with an alleged loan application submitted to NCMC by Allied, NCMC sent various documents addressed to Ms. Ngampa, at the couple’s home address. Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 90-109 of 295. The documents included the following: alleged Loan Information Letter, Truth In Lending Disclosure Statement, Definition of Trust In Lending Terms, Good Faith Estimate, Schedule A to Good Faith Estimate, Servicing Disclosure, Settlement Cost Booklet, Appraisal Disclosure, Fair Lending Notice / ECOA, Consumer’s Guide To Obtaining A Home Mortgage, Addendum to Residential alleged Loan Application, Uniform Mortgage alleged Loan Cost Worksheet, Mortgage Lender Disclosure, New Century Mortgage Privacy Policy. Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 90-109 of 295. (Disputed facts - In the deposition, I had stated that I never seen these documentations until at the closing which was conducted in a hurry fashion by Attorney Samuel P. Reef. Mr. Augustin did attempt to question Attorney Reef, However, don't worry just signed here. The documentation are standard and Attorney Reef did not explained any of the documentation to us at the closing and Attorney Reef also failed to record the closing document a the registry of deeds which caused the alleged New Century Loan to be subordinated to the alleged Danvers Business Loan. Mr. Augustin became aware of that fact while in bankruptcy.)

Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa either initialed or signed and dated March 22, 2004, unless otherwise noted, the following documents: alleged Loan Information Letter (not dated by either), Truth In Lending Disclosure Statement6, Good Faith Estimate, Servicing Disclosure (not dated by Mr. Augustin), Appraisal Disclosure, Fair Lending Notice / ECOA, Consumer’s Guide To Obtaining An alleged Home Mortgage (initialed by Mr. Augustin, not dated), Addendum to Residential alleged Loan Application, Uniform Mortgage alleged Loan Cost Worksheet, Mortgage Lender Disclosure7, and Libor 6-Month ARM With Two Year Rate Lock Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Program Disclosure. Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 90-108 of 295; Tr. 174:2 – 192:15. They also signed and dated the following documents March 22, 2004: (a) alleged Mortgage Loan Commitment (Tr. 113:2 – 116:12; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 255-56 of 295), indicating it was a commitment for an adjustable rate mortgage; and (b) Mortgage Loan Commitment Addendum (Tr. 116:13 – 118:5; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 257 of 295). Thus, Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa had received the foregoing documents not less than twenty-four (24) days prior to the April 15, 2004 closing on the alleged loan provided by NCMC.

On April 15, 2004, Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa entered into an alleged mortgage loan transaction with New Century Mortgage Corporation, whereby they borrowed $288,000 from NCMC, alleged Loan No. 0001455240 (the “NCMC Loan”). The alleged NCMC Loan was secured by a mortgage on the property located at 28 Cedar Street, Lowell, Massachusetts 01852 (the “Property”). They received $27,017.06 cash from the transaction, which Mr. Augustin invested into his business. Tr. 81:6-12; 121:1-13; Tr. 201:7 – 202:5; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 48 of 295. Proceeds of the alleged NCMC loan were used in part to pay off in full a mortgage held by Ameriquest Mortgage in the amount of $229,621.05. Complaint, ¶ 41; Tr. Exhibit 3 p. 48 of 295. Proceeds of the alleged NCMC Loan also paid amounts owing to the City of Lowell in the amount of $15,911.00. Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 48 of 295.

While Mr. Augustin acknowledges that he executed the various documents in connection with the alleged NCMC Loan, Mr. Augustin takes the position that a Notice of Rescission dated September 21, 2006, acts to make his signature on such loan documents “not there anymore.” Tr. 93:5-19; 94:13-19 . The Trust disputes his legal position (Mr. Augustin's rebuttal based on Regulation Z and commentary in Exhibit as well as to the effect of rescinding his signatures on all alleged loan documents except on the promissory note). The documents that he originally signed at the closing of the alleged NCMC Loan include the following, all dated April 15, 2004 (unless otherwise noted):

a. Uniform Residential alleged Loan Application (Tr. 92:7 – 93:17; Tr. 96:18 – 97:6; Tr. 97:13-20; Tr. 98:15 – 99:17; Exhibit 3, pp. 164-167 of 295);

b. HUD 1 Settlement Statement (Tr. 118:7 – 120:5; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 48 of 295);

c. Mortgage (Tr. 122:13 – 124:22; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 18-33 of 295);

d. Adjustable Rate Rider (Tr. 125:1 – 129:9; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 34-37 of 295);

e. Adjustable Rate Rider Addendum (Tr. 129:11 – 130:10; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 38 of 295);

f. Adjustable Rate Mortgage alleged Loan Program Disclosure (Tr. ___; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 88 of 295);

g. Prepayment Rider (Tr. 132:12 – 133:3; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 39 of 295);

h. Truth-In-Lending Disclosure Statement (Tr. 142:4 – 144:22; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 45 of 295)

i. ECOA/FHA Disclosure (Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 135 of 295);

j. Good Faith Estimate (Tr. 157:19 – 159:3; Tr. 179:13-18; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 46-47 of 295);

k. Mortgage Lender Disclosure (Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 139 of 295);

l. Consumer’s Guide To Obtaining A Home Mortgage (Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 143-45 of 295);

m. Uniform Mortgage alleged Loan Cost Worksheet (Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 146-47 of 295);

n. Notice of Right to Cancel (Tr. 151:13 – 152:21; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 44 of 295);

o. Borrower’s Certification and Authorization dated April 15, 2004 (Tr. 138:5 – 142:2; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 126 of 295);

p. Occupancy Affidavit and Financial Status (Tr. 152:22 – 153:12; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 134 of 295);

q. Servicing Disclosure (tr. Exhibit 3, p. 89 of 295); and

r. Addendum to Residential alleged Loan Application (not dated) (Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 132 of 295 and p. 148 of 295).

The Universal Residential alleged Loan Application (the “Application”), signed by Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa, indicates that the alleged NCMC Loan was an “ARM” rather than a fixed-rate loan. Tr. 96:18 – 97:6; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 164-67 of 295.
The Application also indicates that the total income of Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa is $5,305 per month prepared by Allied and submitted to NCMC for verification and underwriting. Tr. 97:13-20; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 164-67 of 295.

Finally, the Application contains an acknowledgement stating:
Each of the undersigned specifically represents to Lender … and agrees and acknowledges that (1) the information provided in this application is true and correct as of the date set forth opposite my signature and that any intentional or negligent misrepresentation of this information contained in this application may result in civil liability, including monetary damages to any person who may suffer any loss due to reliance upon any misrepresentation that I have made on this application, and/or in criminal penalties …

Tr. 98:15 – 99:17; Tr. Exhibit 3, pp. 164-67 of 295.

Allied acted as a broker for Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa in connection with the alleged NCMC Loan. It was Allied that identified NCMC as a possible lender and Allied who initially submitted the alleged loan application of Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa to NCMC. Allied is a third-party broker and is not and was not affiliated with NCMC or any other Debtor. Nobody from NCMC nor anybody from Allied led Mr. Augustin to believe that Allied was controlled by NCMC. Tr. 24:8-18. (Mr. Augustin rebuttal at the deposition that according to the reported origination data (compiled and reviewed data concerning New Century's residential mortgage loans for one-to-four-family homes that New Century reported pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 USC 2801-2810, (“HDMA”) was that NCMC, as the data made clear, as compared to its peer lending companies, was far more likely to make a first lien loan to any given applicant by 50% in 2005 and by 62% in 2006) and according to the report of Michael J. Missal, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, Final Report Excerpt: Page 75 / 54 reports: “…New Century apparently used an outdated DOS-based loan underwriting and appraisal operating system, which, according to one Management interviewee, allowed users to “finagle anything.”168”

Mr. Augustin does not allege that New Century filled out the Application . Tr. 27:17 – 28:6. Mr. Augustin alleges that Allied manipulated the facts on the Uniform Residential alleged Loan Application in connection with the alleged NCMC Loan. Tr. 45:1 – 46:4. The Trust leaves Mr. Augustin to his burden to prove the allegation (Mr. Augustin rebuttal since Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 804 & 807 and its state law equivalents, the declaration or act of a co-conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible in evidence against another party to the conspiracy regardless of his presence or absence at the time of the declaration or act, and regardless of whether the declaration or act was by a conspirator who has been joined as a defendant in the pending action). Specifically, Mr. Augustin alleges that Allied overstated Ms. Ngampa’s income at $4,000 per month. Tr. 196:14-18; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 165 of 295. The Trust leaves Mr. Augustin to his burden to prove the allegation. At closing on the NCMC Loan, both Mr. Augustin and Ms. Ngampa recognized that Ms. Ngampa’s income on the Uniform Residential Loan Application was wrong, but signed nonetheless. Tr. 197:2 – 198:2; Tr. Exhibit 4, p. 15.

Attorney Samuel Reef was present at the closing on the alleged NCMC Loan. Tr. 21:6-9. Samuel Reef never told Mr. Augustin that he was Mr. Augustin’s lawyer. Tr. 21:12-16. The Addendum to Residential alleged Loan Application signed by Mr. Augustin indicates that “The responsibility of the attorney for the alleged Lender is to protect the interests of the alleged Lender” and that “You, the Borrower, may, at your own expense, engage an attorney of your own selection to represent your interests in the transaction.” Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 132 of 295 and p. 148 of 295.
Mr. Augustin alleges that Samuel Reef rushed through the closing on the alleged NCMC loan. Tr. 84:8. However, Mr. Augustin admitted that he did not try to read the alleged loan documents at the closing on the alleged NCMC Loan. Tr. 86:2-4; 143:12 – 145:2.

The appraisal used in connection with the alleged NCMC Loan, prepared by Beacon Appraisal and requested by Allied, indicates that the Property had a value of $320,000 as of December 29, 2003. Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 227-44 of 295. Mr. Augustin believed the Property had a value of $300,000 in early to mid-2004. Tr. 106:3-14. Beacon Appraisal is a third-party and is not and was not affiliated with NCMC or any other Debtor.

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth”), the entity that provided title insurance to NCMC in connection with the alleged NCMC Loan, is a third-party and is not and was not affiliated with NCMC or any other Debtor.

Mr. Augustin asserts that he only received one copy of the Federal Truth-In-Lending Disclosure Statement dated April 15, 2004. Tr. 146:9 – 151:4; Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 45 of 295). The Trust leaves Mr. Augustin to his burden to prove the assertion (Mr. Augustin's rebuttal - Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 804 & 807 and its state law equivalents, the declaration or act of a co-conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible in evidence against another party to the conspiracy regardless of his presence or absence at the time of the declaration or act, and regardless of whether the declaration or act was by a conspirator who has been joined as a defendant in the pending action). However, the basement of the Property flooded after April 15, 2004, and Mr. Augustin lost many records which resulted in Mr. Augustin not producing many documents to the Trust. Tr. 238:16 – 242:13.

Mr. Augustin maintains, under his theory of money mechanics (objection since a theory is a thing that has not been proven. However, Modern Money Mechanics is a government document (RULE 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence) and publication of the Federal Reserve of Chicago, Copies of this workbook are available from: Public Information Center, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, P.O. Box 834, Chicago. IL 60690-0834, [3 121 322-5 1 1 1. This publication originally was written by Dorothy M. Nichols in May 1961. The June 1992 revision was prepared by Anne Marie L. Gonczy. REVISED May I968, September 1971, June 1975, October 1982, June 1992, February 1994, 40M, Printed in U.S.A.) that had he understood the relationships between borrowers and lenders and had they been properly disclosed to him that he would not have made one payment under the alleged NCMC Loan. Tr. 171:13 – 173:17.

The alleged NCMC Loan was funded on April 20, 2004. Trust’s Discovery Responses, p. 6. The funds were wired from NCMC’s UBS Credit Line, with UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc. Trust’s Discovery Responses, pp. 4-5. On May 27, 2004, NCMC sold the alleged NCMC Loan to Morgan Stanley Capital Corporation. Trust’s Discovery Responses, pp. 16-17. On September 1, 2004, servicing of the alleged NCMC Loan was released to Chase Manhattan Mortgage.

Between April 2004 and September 2005, Mr. Augustin made a little less than $45,000 per year. Tr. 87:6 – 89:3. He was able to make the payments owing on the alleged NCMC Loan during this time. Tr. 87:16-19; 164:14 – 166:11. The monthly payment on the alleged NCMC Loan did not change during this time. Tr. 89:4-12. The monthly payment under the alleged NCMC Loan was $1,945.18. Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 51 of 295 (out of order and found between pp. 168 and 192). Mr. Augustin’s monthly payment under his prior alleged Ameriquest loan was $1,667.12. Tr. Exhibit 3, p. 192 of 295.
Prior to September 2004, Mr. Augustin was unable to make the payments due under the alleged Danvers Loan. Tr. 205:8 – 207:4; Tr. 217:19 – 218:15. This resulted in Danversbank taking actions to foreclose on the Property. Complaint, Exhibits 10, 12.
Mr. Augustin indicated that he was able to continue paying the amounts due on the alleged NCMC Loan and would have continued to do so if the judge in his bankruptcy case had not granted Danversbank stay relief to proceed to foreclose on the Property. Tr. 164:17 – 166:8; 198:13-22; Tr. Exhibit 4, p. 24-5.

Between April 2004 and September 2005, Mr. Augustin applied for another refinancing loan with Chase, hoping to get enough money to pay off the alleged Danvers Loan. Tr. 70:1-13; 89:13 – 90:8.

In September 2004, Ms. Ngampa moved to Illinois because of the stress related to Mr. Augustin’s failed operations in Haiti and Danversbank calling about foreclosing on the house and, once in Illinois, she took a mechanical engineering job with Abbott Laboratories. Tr. 209:12 – 212:13; Tr. 217:12 – 218:22. During this time, Mr. Augustin traveled back and forth between the United States and Haiti. Tr. 210:11-21; Tr. 217:12 – 218:22.

On September 26, 2005, Mr. Augustin filed for personal bankruptcy under chapter 7, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Case No. 05-46957. Jonathan R. Goldsmith was appointed chapter 7 trustee over Mr. Augustin’s estate. The cause of Mr. Augustin’s personal bankruptcy relates primarily to the alleged Danvers Loan and his attempt to save his home. Tr. 202:9-14; Tr. 205:11 – 207-1; Tr. Exhibit 2, Response to Interrogatory 17.

On or about March 8, 2006, Mr. Augustin commenced an action against Danversbank, Ameriquest Mortgage, Global Consultants Direct, Alen H. Segal, Old Republic National Insurance, NCMC, Allied Home Mortgage Capital, Samuel P. Reef, Land America Commonwealth and Chase Home Finance by filing a complaint (the “Complaint”) in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Case No. 06-10368-NMG (the “Massachusetts Action”). Mr. Augustin indicates that the Complaint “is in response of defendant, Danversbank, foreclosing on plaintiff’s residential house scheduled for March 15, 2006.” Complaint, ¶ 13.

On or about March 9, 2006, Commonwealth purchased a mortgage on the property held by Danversbank dated May 17, 2002 (the “Danvers Mortgage”), and entered into an Assignment of Mortgage from Danversbank dated March 9, 2006. See Subordination of Mortgage recorded in the Middlesex County Registry of Deeds.

On March 29, 2006, Commonwealth, as holder of the Danvers Mortgage, agreed to subordinate the Danvers Mortgage to NCMC’s mortgage on the Property. See Subordination of Mortgage recorded in the Middlesex County Registry of Deeds.
On June 28, 2007, Chase Home Finance LLC, in its capacity as attorney-in-fact for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee, filed a foreclosure deed in the Middlesex County Registry of Deeds. See Massachusetts Foreclosure Deed recorded in the Middlesex County Registry of Deeds.

On or about February 9, 2008, Commonwealth filed a Waiver of Notice of Foreclosure in the Middlesex County Registry of Deeds in connection with the foreclosure on the Property. See Waiver of Notice of Foreclosure recorded in the Middlesex County Registry of Deeds.

Mr. Augustin admits that the loss of the Property to foreclosure was primarily the result of the Danvers Loan going bad. Tr. 215:2-10.

Mr. Augustin asserts that, while in his personal bankruptcy, he was able to uncover a civil conspiracy of mortgage fraud that he alleges involved all the various parties involved with the alleged NCMC Loan, including NCMC. The Trust disputes that any such conspiracy existed and leaves Mr. Augustin to his burden to prove the same (Mr. Augustin rebuttal since Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 804 & 807 and its state law equivalents, the declaration or act of a co-conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible in evidence against another party to the conspiracy regardless of his presence or absence at the time of the declaration or act, and regardless of whether the declaration or act was by a conspirator who has been joined as a defendant in the pending action).

On September 21, 2006, Mr. Augustin prepared a Notice of Rescission apparently directed to NCMC more than two years after the alleged NCMC Loan closed. The Notice of Rescission was not executed by Ms. Ngampa. The Notice of Rescission did not indicate that either of them were prepared to return the proceeds of the NCMC Loan. (Mr. Augustin objects based on Regulation Z which does not mandate for rescission by both husband and wife as necessary.)

Mr. Augustin’s Asserted Bases of Claim
In support of the Remaining Claim, Mr. Augustin alleges that NCMC participated in a civil conspiracy of mortgage fraud. NCMC’s alleged role in such civil conspiracy was: (i) its alleged failure to verify Ms. Ngampa’s income, (ii) its alleged failure to follow its own underwriting guidelines; and (iii) and its alleged failure to provide material disclosures concerning financial roles of borrowers and lenders. Tr. 28:20 – 29:21; 56:10 – 57:9. Additionally, Mr. Augustin alleges that: (i) he was deceived into thinking he was getting a fixed rate alleged loan instead of the adjustable rate mortgage from NCMC (Tr. 35:2-20; 51:6-9) because he requested a fixed rate loan from Allied (Tr. 42:2-12 and 43:6-12); (ii) he was unaware there was a pre-payment penalty associated with the alleged NCMC Loan (Tr. 35:19 – 36:7); and (iii) the closing attorney, Samuel Reef, rushed the closing (Tr. 49:4 – 50:14).

Mr. Augustin also asserts a fraud claim. He acknowledged in his deposition that his fraud claim relates only to the alleged failure of NCMC to verify his wife’s income as stated on the Application. Tr. 33:9-17; Tr. 41:4-12.

The Trust disputes these allegations and assertions and leaves Mr. Augustin to his burden to prove the same (Mr. Augustin's rebuttal since under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 804 & 807 and its state law equivalents, the declaration or act of a co-conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible in evidence against another party to the conspiracy regardless of his presence or absence at the time of the declaration or act, and regardless of whether the declaration or act was by a conspirator who has been joined as a defendant in the pending action).

DAMAGES SOUGHT BY MR. AUGUSTIN
On or about September 15, 2009, Mr. Augustin filed his Legal Basis for Calculating Compensatory and Punitive Damages Per Court Order Due On September 15, 2009 [D.I. 9888] (the “Damages Computation”).

In his Damages Computation, Mr. Augustin breaks down his damages into several categories. These include asserted compensatory damages for pain and suffering of $1 million, alleging that: (i) Mr. Augustin was forced to take low paying jobs in order to have flexibility to conduct legal research, (ii) loss of consortium while he remained in Massachusetts and the rest of his family moved to Illinois; (iii) loss of rental income from the property that was foreclosed upon; (iv) emotional trauma when bank sold his home, (v) residual effects such as anxiety for not having a legal consultant on filing proper pleadings, and (vi) pain in suffering in future due to lack of trust in the banking system. The compensatory damages also include economic damages, alleging (i) loss of earning capacity, asserting damages of $480,209.23 based upon Mr. Augustin having a hypothetical job as an operational manager, and (ii) damage to property, asserting damages of $700,000 premised on estimated value plus interest payment for 30 years. The total amount of compensatory damages asserted is $2,180,209.23.

The amount of damages asserted by Mr. Augustin related to his alleged loss of earning capacity ($480,209.23) is derived from a job with TUFTS Health Plan that Mr. Augustin actually interviewed for and did not receive. Tr. 223-13 – 226:4. (objection and disputed fact)

The Damages Computation also includes a request for punitive damages in the amount of $21,802,092.26 based on various allegations primarily involving:
1) civil conspiracy of mortgage fraud;
2) accounting;
3) breach of fiduciary duty;
4) fraud;
5) fraud in the inception and inducement;
6) fabricated fraud;
7) constructive fraud;
8) conversion (property rights deprivation);
9) duress;
10) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
11) negligence;
12) rescission;
13) spoliation of evidence;
14) constructive and inducement fraud;
15) negligent misrepresentation;
16) concealment;
17) failure to disclose material facts;
18) gross negligence;
19) contract related matters;
20) intentional malice, trickery, or deceit ;
21) money on account and

The Trust disputes the asserted damages and leaves Mr. Augustin to his burden to prove the same (Mr. Augustin's rebuttal since Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 804 & 807 and its state law equivalents, the declaration or act of a co-conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible in evidence against another party to the conspiracy regardless of his presence or absence at the time of the declaration or act, and regardless of whether the declaration or act was by a conspirator who has been joined as a defendant in the pending action).

LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether NCMC failed to adhere to its underwriting policies in connection with the
alleged NCMC Loan, and, if so, whether NCMC is liable to Mr. Augustin as a result of the same.

Whether NCMC engaged in fraud or civil conspiracy in connection with the origination of the NCMC Loan, and, if so, whether NCMC is liable to Mr. Augustin as a result of the same.

Whether the major significance of the conspiracylies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasorfor all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity'' (Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 44, citing Mox Incorporated v. Woods (1927) 202 Cal. 675, 677-78.)' (Id. at 511)).

Whether Mass. Gen. Laws c. 183C was in effect at the time the NCMC Loan closed, and, if not, whether the statute has any retroactivity clause. To the extent Mass. Gen. Laws c. 183C is applicable to the NCMC Loan, whether the alleged NCMC Loan was a “high cost” loan under Massachusetts High Coast Loan law (Mass. Gen. Laws c. 183C, § 2), and, if so, whether the NCMC Loan violated the Massachusetts High Coast Loan law.

Whether NCMC and its agents followed its standard practices as in evaluating
creditworthiness of Mr. Augustin's wife or customs of the credit industry by conducting reasonable investigation of employment whereby a “red flag” would have alerted NCMC or its agents presented statement that were inaccurate and misrepresented (In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108 (3d Cir. 1995).

Whether NCMC violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) (12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)), and, if so, whether any RESPA claim alleged by Mr. Augustin is timely under 12 U.S.C. § 2614. To the extent any such RESPA violation by NCMC is found and it is determined to be timely, whether NCMC is liable to Mr. Augustin as a result of the same.

Whether the alleged NCMC Loan violated the Federal Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) and/or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.), and, if so, whether NCMC is liable to Mr. Augustin as a result of the same.

Whether NCMC engaged in “flipping” or “reverse redlining” with respect to the NCMC Loan, and, if so, whether NCMC is liable to Mr. Augustin as a result of the same.

Whether the Notice of Rescission dated September 21, 2006, more than two years after
the NCMC Loan funded, was timely and that the security interest, promissory note or lien arising by operation of law on the property becomes automatically void (15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); Reg. Z §§ 226.15(d) (1), 226.23(d)(1), the creditor’s interest in the property is “automatically negated regardless of its status and whether or not it was recorded or perfected” (Official Staff Commentary §§ 226.15(d)(1)-1,
226.23(d)(1)-1) as noted by the Official Staff Commentary.

Whether the Notice of Rescission dated September 21, 2006, more than two years after the alleged NCMC Loan funded, has the legal effect of voiding any signatures provided by Mr. Augustin in connection with the alleged NCMC Loan, including those signatures of Mr. Augustin or Ms. Ngampa executed prior to the April 15, 2004 closing on the alleged NCMC Loan.

Whether Samuel Reef engaged in fraud or civil conspiracy in connection with the origination of the alleged NCMC Loan, and, if so, whether NCMC is liable to Mr. Augustin as a result of the same.

Whether NCMC has any liability to Mr. Augustin for any alleged bad acts performed by Allied and any damages flowing from such bad acts.

Whether NCMC has any liability to Mr. Augustin for any alleged bad acts performed by Beacon Appraisal and any damages flowing from such bad acts.

Whether NCMC has any liability to Mr. Augustin for any alleged bad acts performed by Commonwealth and any damages flowing from such bad acts.

(Disputed Facts – I was ordered by the court to tabulate damages. Thus, the last tabulation of damages is what is relevant) Whether the asserted compensatory damages of $2,180,209.23 should be allowed as timely (i.e., not time barred) to the extent they exceed $700,264.80.

To the extent that the Court allows Mr. Augustin a claim for punitive damages, whether such allowed claim should be classified as a priority secured claim since it involved the principle of civil conspiracy of mortgage fraud and the Supreme Court holding that has held that punitive or multiple damages which arise from such fraud are not dischargeable (Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 130 L. Ed. 2D 341 (1998)).

Whether Mr. Augustin and/or Ms. Ngampa are barred from recovering any claim against NCMC as a result of knowingly submitting false information in their Application to obtain the alleged NCMC Loan.

Burden of Proof (Trust)
A claim that alleges facts sufficient to support a legal liability to the claimant is “prima facie” valid and satisfies the claimant’s initial obligation to go forward. In re Alleghany International, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1992). “The burden of going forward then shifts to the objector to produce evidence sufficient to negate the prima facie validity of the filed claim. It is often said that the objector must produce evidence in equal force to the prima facie case.” Id. “The burden of persuasion is always on the claimant.” Id. at 174.

The Trust does not believe that the Remaining Claim alleges facts sufficient to entitle the claim to prima facie validity. Accordingly, the Trust believes that Mr. Augustin bears the burden of proof on all legal issues except those in paragraphs 101 and 102. Such issues only come into play if the Court allows all or any portion of the Remaining Claim.

Burden of Proof (Mr. Augustin)
Whether under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 804 & 807, the declaration or act of a co-conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible in evidence against another party to the conspiracy regardless of his presence or absence at the time of the declaration or act, and regardless of whether the declaration or act was by a conspirator who has been joined as a defendant in the pending action?

Whether Mr. Augustin has met the elements under the "civil conspiracy principle" that has been defined by the courts as (1) an agreement (2) by two or more persons (NMC, Allied, Samuel P. Reef) (3) to perform overt act(s) (4) in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy (5) to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means (6) causing injury to another.

Whether the facts, law, breach of duties by NCMC and evidences presented to the Court will show that Mr. Augustin has valid claims and damages based on the principle of:
20) civil conspiracy of mortgage fraud;
21) accounting;
22) breach of fiduciary duty;
23) fraud;
24) fraud in the inception and inducement;
25) fabricated fraud;
26) constructive fraud;
27) conversion (property rights deprivation);
28) duress;
29) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
30) negligence;
31) rescission;
32) spoliation of evidence;
33) constructive and inducement fraud;
34) negligent misrepresentation;
35) concealment;
36) failure to disclose material facts;
37) gross negligence;
38) contract related matters;
20) intentional malice, trickery, or deceit ;
21) money on account and
22) punitive damages

WITNESSES
The Trust intends to call Patricia J. Lindsay of Rylin Capital Corp. as its witness to testify regarding the Debtors’ underwriting policies and related matters. Ms. Lindsay was employed by NCMC between June 1997 and December 2007. She was hired by NCMC as a wholesale loan underwriter in June 1997, and held such position through approximately December 1998. From approximately January 2003 through December 2007, Ms. Lindsay held the position of Vice President of Corporate Risk Management at NCMC.
Mr. Augustin intends to present himself as his witness in support of his claim.

LIST OF EXHIBITS
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a list of exhibits and discovery items that the Trust intends to introduce into evidence at the trial.
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a list of exhibits and discovery items that Mr. Augustin intends to introduce into evidence at the trial.

[Remainder of page left intentionally blank]
ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TRIAL
The parties expect that the trial shall take approximately three hours.
Dated: October 15, 2010

BLANK ROME LLP
David W. Carickhoff (No. 3715)
1201 Market Street, Suite 800
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Co-Counsel to New Century Liquidating Trust

-and-

BUCKLEY SANDLER, LLP
Caitlin Kasmar
11250 24th Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, DC 20037

Special Regulatory Counsel to
New Century Liquidating Trust

-and-


________________________
Pierre R. Augustin, Private Attorney General, Ex Rel
3941 Persimmon Drive, #102
Fairfax, VA 22031

Self-Represented Claimant
Exhibit A

Trust’s Exhibit List
and Discovery Items List
Exhibit B

Mr. Augustin’s Exhibit List
and Discovery Items List

Saturday, November 8, 2008

Letter To Preserve Information

“A good name is more desirable than great riches; to be esteemed is better than silver or gold.” - Proverb 22:1

Praises & Thanks be unto The Lord My God for the wisdom, knowledge and understanding on legal matter because I received countless feedbacks from folks facing foreclosure and bankruptcy around the United States as follows:

Comments: "I have been inundated with TILA questions. So I went out hunting to see if anyone had already written about it in terms that a lay person might be able to understand. What I found is shown below. I believe it to be generally correct and the citations are good citations of law. See this site for the entire write-up. It should give most lay people an idea on how to handle this and it will be valuable to your lawyer if he/she is not totally familiar with the TILA context at the following link:" http://rcxloan.com/Civil_Action_BK_Motion_14.htm. Statement made by Attorney at Law, Neil F. Garfield, M.B.A., J.D.

Pierre R. Augustin, MPA, MBA, Pro Se
Consumer Creditor and a Party In Interest
3941 Persimmon Drive, #102
Fairfax, VA 22031, Tel: 703-584-5998, Email: hdmhos@aol.com

October 23, 2008

Attorney David W. Carickhoff, Jr
Blank Rome LLP, Chase Manhattan Centre, 1201 Market Street, Suite 800, Wilmington, DE 19801 Records Custodian for New Century TRS Holding, Inc. & Attorney, Christopher M. Samis, Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. , 920 N. King Street, Wilmington, DE 19801

CERTIFIED MAIL: 7007 3020 0002 3324 9198

Re: New Century TRS Holding, Inc., New Century Liquidating Trustee v. Pierre R. Augustin, Pro Se, Case #: 07-10416, Chapter 11

[Our justice system is not perfect. Mistakes are inevitable. However, when
New evidences are presented, the will to do good must prevail over the status quo]

Dear Attorney Carickhoff, Jr., Records Custodian for New Century, Attorneys for Non-Parties & Non-Parties Witnesses (see list of parties):

The purpose of this letter is to notify you that you may have in your possession, or under your control, certain documents and information, including electronically or digitally stored information relevant to the discovery process of the case above. In addition, you, agents, employees & Counsels for Non-Parties Witnesses and Non-Parties Witnesses themselves may have knowledge of facts relevant to matters likely to lead to admissible evidence.

The general rule of discovery is that parties may obtain information regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action so long as the matter is not privileged. It is not grounds for objection that the information may be inadmissible at trial, if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Please keep in mind of the following:

Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(E), Federal Rule 26(a)(2), Federal Rule 26(a)(3)
Basis for Initial Disclosure; Unacceptable Excuses. A party must make its initial disclosures based on the information reasonably available to it. A party is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully investigated the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.

“When discovery rights are trampled, prejudice must be presumed”
Scott v. Greenville Housing Authority, 579 S.E.2d 151, 353 S.C. 639 (S.C. App. 2003)

The filing of this letter with the Federal Courts Will Serve
As Proof of Notification to All Counsels for the Non-Parties Witnesses
and on Non-Parties Witness themselves.

1. BUSINESS RECORDS -- MISSING EVIDENCE -- SPOLIATION
“Spoliation” can be defined as the failure to preserve evidence that is relevant to pending or potential litigation (Jimenez-Sanchez v. Carribean Restaurants, L.L.C, 483 Fed.Supp.2d 140 (D. Puerto Rico 2007)). The actual keeper or custodian of the evidence is irrelevant for discovery purposes. Counsel for New Century TRS Holding, Inc., handing files and documents to New Century Liquidating Trustee’s Counsel as in this case does not shield otherwise discoverable ‘REAL’ evidence. Moreover, New Century Mortgage Corporation had a duty to preserve evidence. Thus, New Century Mortgage Corporation should have known that evidence may be relevant to future litigation as a result of Mr. Augustin’s civil suit (06-10368) and Bankruptcy matter (05-46957).

Because preservation of documents and availability for production are essential to the orderly and expeditious disposition of litigation, the inability to produce documents impedes the litigation process and merits sanctions (See in re Prudential Insurance Company of America Sales Practice Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 36 FED.R.Serv.3d 767 (D.N.J. 1997)). As far as electronic discovery, the producing party is obligated to search available electronic systems for the information demanded in discovery. The willful failure to comply with a discovery demand should be construed as an intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance; no wrongful intent need be shown to impose discovery sanctions (See Smith v. City of New York, 388 Fed.Supp.2d 179 (S.D.N.Y., 2005)(Sanctions may be imposed for both intentional and negligent destruction of evidence)(Martinez v. Abbott Laboratories, 146 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App. 2004).

The duty to preserve evidence arises only when a party knows or reasonably should know that there is a substantial chance that a claim will be filed and that evidence in its possession or control will be material and relevant to that claim)(Clark Construction Group, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 229 F.R.D. 131 (W.D., Tenn., 2005). Under the rule generally governing discovery, a party must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to Consumer Creditor and this includes any document made by an individual likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claim or defenses. The duty to preserve evidence, set forth in the rule that generally governs discovery, extends to all relevant documents from the time the trigger date passes, and continues thereafter.

If documents sought during discovery are destroyed or cannot be located, then that party must provide an explanation for the disappearance of the evidence. There are several factors that the court should utilize in determining whether or not to impose sanctions: [a] - A party destroys, [b] - discoverable matter, [c] - which that party knew or should have known and [d] - was relevant to pending, imminent or reasonably foreseeable litigation.

The following additional factors are considered: [1] - The degree of actual prejudice to the demanding party, [2]-The amount of interference with the judicial process, [3] - The culpability of the responding party, and [4] - Whether or not the responding party was forewarned about the sanctions for noncompliance.

A party has a duty to preserve evidence when that party is placed on notice that evidence is relevant to the subject litigation or when the party should have known that evidence may be relevant to future litigation. One remedy is the so-called “Missing Document Charge,” wherein the jury is specifically informed about the missing document and is told that it may infer that the missing evidence was most unfavorable to the spoliator. See Think Pink, Inc. v. Rim, Inc., 798 N.Y.S.2d 413 (N.Y.A.D., 1 Dept., 2005). Conclusively, if document are reported missing and cannot be located by the opposing counsels, parties and non-parties witnesses, Consumer Creditor will simply infer that the missing evidence was most unfavorable to them.

2. NOTICE TO PRESERVE DOCUMENTS
Pursuant to a duty imposed by law, This Notice and the applicable court rules require the preservation of all information from your Company’s computers and computer storage systems (including tapes, drives, CD’s and DVD’s), regardless of location, relating to this matter. This includes, but is not limited to, all computer files, e-mail and other electronic communications, databases, word processing documents, PDF’s, spreadsheets, calendars, telephone logs, contact information, Internet usage files, and network access information.

For purposes of this notice, the term “electronic information” includes, but is not limited to, all text files, word processing documents, presentation files such as PowerPoint, spreadsheets, e-mail files and information concerning e-mail files (including logs of e-mail, header information, and deleted files), Internet history files and preferences, graphical files in any format, databases, calendar and scheduling information, telephone logs, contact managers, computer activity logs, and all file fragments and backup files containing electronic data.

Upon receipt of this notice, you are prohibited from destroying, erasing, or over-writing any documents, emails, or other writings that relate to the lawsuit, regardless of their physical form, type or date. Extra care must be taken for electronic writings, which can be erased by the mere storage of new data. Your client should preserve and not destroy all passwords, decryption procedures, network access codes, ID names, tutorials, written instructions, decompression or reconstruction software, in addition to all other information necessary to access, view and, if necessary, reconstruct the electronic data that we will request through discovery.

You are under a legal obligation to preserve, maintain, and protect all potential relevant evidence, including electronic evidence. The failure to preserve and retain the electronic data as outlined in this notice constitutes a spoliation of evidence and may subject you to legal claims for damages in addition to evidentiary and monetary sanctions.

3. INITIAL “REQUIRED OR MANDATORY DISCLOSURES” REMINDER - [F.R.C.P. 26(a)]
According to the United States Supreme Court, the purpose behind Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to protect the courts and opposing parties from “delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process (Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999)). An attorney filing a responsive discovery pleading on behalf of a client must certify that he or she made a reasonable effort to see to it that the client has provided all of the information requested. See Poole v. Textron, 192 F.R.D. 494 (D.Md. 2000) and Legault v. Zambarano, 105 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1997).

Once a motion has been filed, the opposing party may not necessarily be able to avoid its consequences, even if he or she files a late response to your discovery requests. See Greenbriar Homes, Inc. v. Builders Insurance, 615 S.E.2d 191, 273 Ga. App. 344 (2005) holding that once a motion for failure to make discovery has been filed, the opposing party may not preclude the imposition of sanctions by making a belated discovery response. Despite the late submission, the trial court was, nevertheless, required to hold a hearing to determine whether the delinquent party’s failure to respond was willful, rather than negligent.

In accordance with Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Consumer Creditor is reminding Counsels for New Century TRS Holding, Inc. & New Century Liquidating Trustee to provide their mandatory disclosure as follows:

This Is A Reminder To Provide ‘Initial Mandatory Disclosures’ From Previous Notice To Produce
1. In Exhibit 1, New Century Mortgage denied the mortgage application on January 22, 2004.
Please provide the name of the person who made that decision and have him or her present at the deposition. If that person is not available, please state why? Otherwise, please provide a ‘designated deponent’ [Name] & [address] that is likely to have discoverable information relevant to Consumer Creditor’s claims as per FRCP 30(b)(6) and indicate whether he or she has personal knowledge regarding the subject loan transaction prior the deposition date.

2. In Exhibit 2, New Century Mortgage denied the mortgage application on March 9, 2004. Please provide the name of the person who made that decision and have him or her present at the deposition. If that person is not available, please state why? Otherwise, please provide a ‘designated deponent’ [Name] & [address] that is likely to have discoverable information relevant to Consumer Creditor’s claims as per FRCP 30(b)(6) and indicate whether he or she has personal knowledge regarding the subject loan transaction prior the deposition date.

3. In Exhibit 3, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Non-Party) reported on March 29, 2004 that the title was clear for closing. Please provide the name of the person who made that decision and have him or her present at the deposition. If that person is not available, please state why? Otherwise, please provide a ‘designated deponent’ [Name] & [address] that is likely to have discoverable information relevant to Consumer Creditor’s claims as per FRCP 30(b)(6) and indicate whether he or she has personal knowledge regarding the subject loan transaction prior the deposition date.

4. In Exhibit 4, Consumer Creditor and a Party In Interest was issued a mortgage. Please provide the name of the person who made that decision and have him or her present at the deposition. If that person is not available, please state why? Otherwise, please provide a ‘designated deponent’ [Name] & [address] that is likely to have discoverable information relevant to Consumer Creditor’s claims as per FRCP 30(b)(6) and indicate whether he or she has personal knowledge regarding the subject loan transaction prior the deposition date.

In accordance to FRCP 26(a)(1)(A), you must voluntarily disclose additional names, addresses and telephone numbers of each individual & non-parties likely to have discoverable information. The disclosure must also clearly indicate “The subjects of the information” of each these individuals knows, their title, company affiliation, copy of their job description and to whom they report at their respective companies.

4. FULL DISCOVERIES RIGHTS GRANTED By Judge Kevin J. Carey on August 20, 2008, Extracted from August 20, 2008 Transcript, page 69

“MR. AUGUSTIAN: -- you gave the option to -- to the attorney Christopher whether I should proceed as an adversary proceeding or contested matter. He chose adver -- contested matter. I was not called forward to ask my opinion. That’s why I stepped forward to --

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, the --

MR. AUGUSTIAN: -- let the Court know.

THE COURT: I guess the -- the short way of -- of responding to that is we can design pre -- pretrial procedures basically to afford whatever due process rights you would like to have. So, in substance, there’s going to be no difference at the end of the day. So, you will have all the rights that you would have had had this been commenced as an adversary proceeding. And, it’s actually procedurally probably better for you that it proceed that way. So, we’ll make it so that there is no difference. Do you understand what I’m saying?

MR. AUGUSTIAN: Yes, Your Honor. I was just reading the -- the rules as it states. So, I am not expert in the law. But, if you feel that way, that I -- all my rights will be protected, then -- it’s on the record.

Then, if -- if some time I feel it does not and something fall through the crack, I’ll file an appeal.

5. NON-PARTIES ORDINARY WITNESSES
Please review the certificate of service for the complete lists of non-parties ordinary witnesses and their attorneys in the above matter. Non Parties Witnesses (someone and companies) are not a party in this matter but the records they hold have some bearing on his claims and New Century Mortgage Corporation had transactions with the non-parties in relation to Consumer Creditor’s mortgage and business loan.

Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “any party may serve on any other party a request to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on the requestor’s behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono records, and other data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable form) ...” [Emphasis supplied]. Rule 1001(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “Writings” and “recordings” consist of letters, words or numbers or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording or other form of data compilation [Emphasis supplied]. Therefore, Non-Parties Witnesses are prime ordinary witness subject to discovery and deposition in accordance with the rule of law.

6. NOTICE TO REQUEST ‘RAW FACTS & REAL EVIDENCE’ from All Counsels of Non-Parties & Non-Parties Witnesses
Now the time has come, in view of the financial crisis, for the opposing Counsels to move behind the legal technicalities and abide by their oath for due diligences…

“I (repeat the name) solemnly swear that I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless, or unlawful suit, or give aid or consent to the same; I will delay no man for lucre or malice; but I will conduct myself in the office of an attorney within the courts according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, and with all good fidelity as well to the courts as my clients. So help me God”

… because the $700 billion bailout to Financial Institutions on Wall Street by our Political Leaders and Public Officials resulted out from poor mortgage underwriting practices encouraged by the banks involved in this matter.

Reflectively, Consumer Creditor stands before the opposing Counsels with a sense of sadness for the ongoing foreclosure crisis has resulted in the largest currency devaluation in modern U.S. History and affects every American and every foreign person, government, agency, village or city that put money into pooled funds of the collateralized debt obligations CDO’s.” Let us all hope and pray that the bailout stabilized local, national and global financial market and economical activities.

The timing of these economical, financial and operative facts mentioned above are intertwined with Consumer Creditor’s matter and are always considered fair game for discoveries. So too are the legal theories and defenses of the action along with all real evidence that any party has obtain or discover (Myers v. City of Highland Village, 212 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Tex. 2003). The scope of permissible discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as with all of its state counterparts is very broad. Rule 26(b)(1) specifically permits discovery of “any matter, not privileged, which is relevant” with respect to any “claim” or “defense.”

The subsection then takes the trouble to list certain examples, such as “books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.” If there is any point or purpose at all to the discovery process, it must enable Consumer Creditor’s access to those raw facts and pieces of “hard evidence” that form the underlying basis for the subject matter. These are the one-of-a-kind materials and information that the court have always make available through discovery.

(Extract from the August 20, 2008 Transcript p 70: 12-21, “Obviously you had said why don’t you, in the meantime, reach out to Mr. Augustian, investigate the facts and circumstances on -- you know, from a substantive perspective, and determine whether or not there’s any way to settle the claim. I did commence an investigation and spoke with the former general counsel of the company, who is now functioning as a consultant. The results of that investigation at our transition meeting I did produce to Mr. Carickhoff, so he has them)

Experts who are to testify and who also provide analysis, guidance, reports and opinions are witnesses nonetheless. An expert may wear the hat of a “consultant,” but his status as a testifying witness trumps the consultant status. In particular, as a testifying expert, he is certainly subject to discovery. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) mandates both the preparation and disclosure of a written signed report. According to that rule, the report:

“... shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.”

The Counsels should not use the Work Product Doctrine as a device for hiding facts or evidence that are discoverable. Those hoping to erect a shield for such information often mix the hard evidence with work product materials, or try to mis-characterize such evidence as work product United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 187 F.R.D. 152 (D.Del. 1999); United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. Wis. 1999); Starlight Int’l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626 (D.Kan. 1999). Common sense dictates that all parties should be entitled to know the underlying predicates and defenses of all of the other parties.

CONCLUSION
The Advisory Committee Notes for the 2006 amendments to Rule 34(b) state as follows: Rule 34(b) provides that a party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the discovery request. The production of electronically stored information should be subject to comparable requirements to protect against deliberate or inadvertent production in ways that raise unnecessary obstacles for the requesting party. As provided in Rule 45, If requested documents are within the control of a party upon whom a valid request is made, that party must obtain and produce those documents (Pleasant v. Pleasant, 632 A.2d 202, 97 Md.App. 711 (1993)). If you have any questions whatsoever, my contact information is below. Thank you.

Respectfully Submitted,

Pierre R. Augustin, MPA, MBA, Pro Se, Consumer Creditor
3941 Persimmon Drive, #102, Fairfax, VA 22031 Tel: (617) 202-8069
Cc: Counsels for Non-Parties Witnesses & Non-Parties Witnesses

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true copy of this letter was mailed to the parties and attorneys below.

Pierre R. Augustin, Pro Se, 3941 Persimmon Drive, #102, Fairfax, VA 22031, Tel: 617-202-8069 Cert# = Confirmation of receiving Notice to Depose

Attorneys, non-parties and parties served
Officers and Head of Legal Department
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.
PO Box 908
Manchester, NH 03105 ®
CERT#: 7008 0150 0000 4562 1166
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 9:04 AM on October 10, 2008 in MANCHESTER, NH 03101.

Unites States Bankruptcy Court
District of Delaware, Clerk’s Office
824 N. Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
CERT#: 7008 0150 0000 4562 1197
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 7:03 AM on October 14, 2008 in WILMINGTON, DE 19801.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Standard and Poor’s
55 Water Street
New York, New York 10041
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7150
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 9:20 AM on September 22, 2008 in NEW YORK, NY 10274. Officers and Head of Legal Department

Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp.
401 Edgewater Place
Wakefield, MA ® Officers®
CERT#: 7008 0150 0000 4562 1173

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Real Time Solutions, Inc.
1750 Regal Row, Suite 120
Dallas, TX 75235
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7167
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 9:38 AM on September 22, 2008 in DALLAS, TX 75235.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Danversbank
One Conant Street
Danvers, MA 01923
978-777-2200
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7013
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 8:32 AM on September 22, 2008 in DANVERS, MA 01923.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company OR Chase Home Finance
10790 Rancho Bemado Rd
San Diego, CA 92127
800-548-7912 ®
CERT#: 7008 0150 0000 4562 1180
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 10:58 AM on October 7, 2008 in SAN DIEGO, CA 92127.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Deutsche Bank Securities
U.S. Headquarters
60 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7020
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 12:03 PM on September 22, 2008 in NEW YORK, NY 10268.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
KPMG LLP (“KPMG”)
345 Park Ave
New York, NY 10022
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7051
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 2:05 PM on September 22, 2008 in NEW YORK, NY 10154.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Ameriquest Mortgage Company
1100 Town & Country Road
Orange, CA 92868
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7037
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 12:55 PM on September 19, 2008 in ORANGE, CA 92868.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Old Republic National Insurance
400 Second Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55401-2499
(800) 328-4441
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7181
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 9:06 AM on September 22, 2008 in MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55401.

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Beacon Appraisal
396 W. Broadway
Boston, MA 02127
617-269-1210
CERT#: 7008 1140 0001 0014 7044
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 11:55 AM on September 20, 2008 in BOSTON, MA 02127.
Legal Department
Small Business Administration (SBA)
SBA Loan#: LDP5329494000
SBA Loan Name: Admerk Corp. Inc.
Note date: May 17, 2002

Officers and Head of Legal Department
Chase Home Finance
4915 Independence Parkway, 2nd FL, Legal Dept.
Tampa, FL 33634 ®
CERT#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7174
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 10:38 AM on September 19, 2008 in SAN DIEGO, CA 92128.

Counsel to the Debtors
Suzzanne S. Uhland, Ana Acevedo, Emily R. Culler
O’Melveny & Myers LLP
275 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
T: (415) 984-8700, F: (415) 984-8701

Co-Counsel to the Debtors
Mark D. Collins, Michael J. Merchant, Christopher M. Samis
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.
One Rodney Square, P.O. Box 551
Wilmington, DE 19899
T: (302) 651-7700

Real Time Solution, Inc.
1750 Regal Row, Ste 120
Dallas, TX 75235
Attorney, David W. Carickhoff, Jr
Blank Rome LLP
Chase Manhattan Centre
1201 Market Street, Suite 800
Wilmington, DE 19801
302-425-6400

Joseph J. McMahon, Jr., Esquire
United States Department of Justice
Office of the United States Trustee
J. Caleb Boggs Federal Building
844 King Street, Suite 2207, Lockbox 35
Wilmington, DE 19801, Courtesy copy

President
Tedd Chambler
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company Inc
5600 Cox Rd
Glen Allen, VA 23060-9266

United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Delaware
824 Market Street, 3rd Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
T: (302) 252-2900

U.S. Trustee
United States Trustee
844 King Street, Room 2207
Lockbox #35
Wilmington, DE 19899-0035
302-573-6491

President
Thomas Jacob
Chase Home Finance
194 Wood Ave S # 2
Iselin, NJ 08830

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Attorney, Bonnie Glantz Fatell
Blank Rome LLP
1201 Market Street, Suite 800
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 425-6423

Attorney, Christopher M. Samis
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.
920 N. King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
302-651-7845

Deutsche Bank National Trust
300 S. Grand Ave, Ste 3950
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Chairman and CEO
Timothy P. (Tim) Flynn
KPMG LLP (“KPMG”)
757 Third Ave.
New York, NY 10017

President
Deven Sharma
Standard and Poor’s
55 Water Street
New York, New York 10041

Jonathan R. Goldsmith
Jonathan R. Goldsmith, Esq
1350 Main Street
10th Floor
Springfield, MA 01103
413-747-0700
trusteedocs1@jgoldsmithlaw.com
Assigned: 12/16/2005

Jonathan R. Goldsmith
Jonathan R. Goldsmith, Esq
1350 Main Street
10th Floor
Springfield, MA 01103
413-747-0700
trusteedocs1@jgoldsmithlaw.com
1. Cert#:70073020000233248181
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 3:05 PM on September 22, 2008 in SPRINGFIELD, MA 01103.

Giles Krill
Law Offices of Edward A Gottlieb
309 Washington St
Brighton, MA 02135
617-789-5678
Assigned: 03/23/2006 Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.
1. Cert#:70073020000233249174
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 11:37 AM on September 18, 2008 in BRIGHTON, MA 02135.

Charles A. Lovell
Partridge,Snow & Hahn LLP
180 South Main Street,
Providence, RI 02903-7120
(401) 861-8200
cal@psh.com
Assigned: 10/03/2006
representing Chase Home Finance LLC
1. Cert#: 70073020000233249297
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 8:45 AM on September 18, 2008 in PROVIDENCE, RI 02903.
Lauren A. Solar
Barron & Stadfeld, P.C.
100 Cambridge Street
Suite 1310
Boston, MA 02114
617-723-9800
las@barronstad.com
Assigned: 12/10/2005 representing Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee
1. Cert#:7007 3020 0002 3324 9280
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 10:11 AM on September 18, 2008 in BOSTON, MA 02114.

Ronald S. Allen
Morgan, Brown & Joy LLP
200 State Street
11th Floor
Boston, MA 02109
617-523-6666
617-367-3125 (fax)
rallen@morganbrown.com
Assigned: 05/22/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED representing 1.Cert#:7007 3020 0002 3324 9273
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 10:32 AM on September 18, 2008 in BOSTON, MA 02109.
Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp.

CEO, Aseem Mital
Ameriquest Mortgage Company
1100 Town & Country Rd., Suite 1200
Orange, California 92868

R. Bruce Allensworth
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Nicholson Graham LLP - MA
One Lincoln Street
Boston, MA 02111-2950
617-261-3119
617-261-3175 (fax)
ballensworth@klng.com
Assigned: 10/05/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED representing 1. Cert#:7007 3020 0002 3324 9266
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 11:41 AM on September 18, 2008 in BOSTON, MA 02205.
Ameriquest Mortgage Company

John Connolly, Jr.
Law Offices of John Connolly, Jr.
One Common Street
Wakefield, MA 01880
781-245-5490
781-246-4114 (fax)
Assigned: 06/09/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED representing 1. Cert#: 7007 3020 0002 3324 9259
Status: Delivered

Your item was delivered at 9:35 AM on September 18, 2008 in WAKEFIELD, MA 01880.

Old Republic National Insurance

David J. Gallagher
Regnante, Sterio & Osborne
401 Edgewater Place
Suite 630
Wakefield, MA 01880-6210
617-246-2525
781-246-0202 (fax)
dgallagher@regnante.com
Assigned: 05/26/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED representing 1. Cert#:7007 3020 0002 3324 9242
Status: Delivered

Your item was delivered at 2:12 PM on September 19, 2008 in WAKEFIELD, MA 01880.

DanversBank

Kevin P. Geaney
Connolly Law Offices, LLC
545 Salem Street
Wakefield, MA 01880
781-557-2000
781-246-1441 (fax)
kgeaney@wakefieldlaw.com
Assigned: 06/09/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED representing 1. Cert#:7007 3020 0002 3324 9235
Status: Delivered

Your item was delivered at 12:37 PM on September 18, 2008 in WAKEFIELD, MA 01880.


Old Republic National Insurance

Samuel P. Reef
Law Offices of Samuel P. Reef
144 Main Street
Brockton, MA 02301
508-559-0300
508-587-7305 (fax)
Assigned: 07/31/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED representing 1. Cert#: 7008 1140 0001 0014 6993
Status: Delivered

Your item was delivered at 5:12 PM on September 22, 2008 in BROCKTON, MA 02301.


Samuel P. Reef

Alan H. Segal
Law Office of Alan H. Segal
220 Forbes Road
Suite 301
Braintree, MA 02184
617-848-6272
Assigned: 11/03/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED representing
1.Cert#:7008 1140 0001 0014 7006
Status: Delivered
Your item was delivered at 1:16 PM on September 22, 2008 in NEEDHAM HEIGHTS, MA 02494. Alen H. Segal
---------------------------------------------------

I can be reached for a FREE consultation at (cell) 617-202-8069 or (703) 584-5998,



it's FREE, there is no obligation whatsover...! Sincerely, Pierre R. Augustin, MPA, MBA

P.S. - What 3 friends do you know who would benefit from FREE Expert Loan Advice...!
1. Call and Speak with a Consultant, 1-617-202-8069 or (703) 584-5998, it's FREE!

Monday, September 1, 2008

Where Do You Want To Go Today...?

http://rcxloan.com/index.htm

Why Should Prospective Borrowers Apply Today?

“A good name is more desirable than great riches; to be esteemed is better than silver or gold.” - Proverb 22:1

When I became a Loan Officer after I had refinanced my house, I realized that I was a victim of Mortgage Fraud & Predatory Lending that resulted in the foreclosure of my primary residence in Massachusetts. Reluctantly, I had to initiate defensive legal action in Federal Court that involved Real Estate Contract, Truth-In-Lending violations(TILA) and Bankruptcy matters. Unequivocally, I know first hand of the pains and the agonies that one simple decision to sign a legal document can caused.

For that reason, I strongly recommend that in any of your present and future real estate purchase, refinance and/or commercial loan transactions, you should hire a competent lawyer for a critical review of the legal documents (do not rely on the bank's attorney to represent your interest and do not listen to anyone that tells you an attorney is not needed) and a CPA to determine your short and long term financial benefit of the financial investment.
My approach is to help you become a savvy borrower. Thus, you can rest assured, that I have your best interest at heart and will do my utmost best that upon leaving your closing, you have the peace of mind that you are getting a loan that 1) you qualify for and 2) your loan document will not be altered prior the closing.

Praises & Thanks be unto The Lord My God for the wisdom, knowledge and understanding on legal matters because I received countless feedbacks from folks facing foreclosure and bankruptcy around the United States as follows:

Comments: "I have been inundated with TILA questions. So I went out hunting to see if anyone had already written about it in terms that a lay person might be able to understand. What I found is shown below. I believe it to be generally correct and the citations are good citations of law. See this site for the entire write-up. It should give most lay people an idea on how to handle this and it will be valuable to your lawyer if he/she is not totally familiar with the TILA context at the following link:" http://www.rcxloan.com/Civil_Action__BK__Motion_14.htm. Statement made by Attorney at Law, Neil F. Garfield, M.B.A., J.D.

Comments: “our fraud started 25 jan 06 our first big problem was finding an attorney that understood real estate law !. we used 3 before we settled in on our current attorney. I don't know real estate law but I have a computer!!! our current attorney is a contracts attorney and pretty sharp with tila. I would like very much have you and your wife to attend our trial in nov. date not set, as special guest or expert witness. thanks lou, California”

Comments: “Please help. I have seen your civil action suit citing violations of TILA. My situation is described on "ripoff report". I am the mother of two recently deceased sons whose home is set for foreclosure sale Jan. 1, 2008. Homecomings Financial has added enormous pressure by threatening my home, forcing me to bankruptcy and refusing to cooperate in any reasonable way. I believe there is every possibility you could help me get my home "free and clear"."

Comments: "In your suit your actions are that of a truly great American who still believes there is justice. My older son was a lifetime law enforcement officer and in the military. My younger son was a firefighter/paramedic his entire career. They both fervently believed in standing up for those who cannot defend or protect themselves. Were they here, they would be honored to know you. I am hopeful for the first time in almost two years. Sincerely, Barbara”

My vision is to establish a long-term client relationship with you. Whether you are looking for Residential, Business or Commercial Loans, RCxLOAN.com is founded on the belief that we are providing a service and not just a product. I will guide and counsel you through the loan process, avoiding the pitfalls and capitalizing on the opportunities for you.

Based on your needs and situation, I will show you which mortgage products work best for you. I will give you the personalized attention that you deserve to ensure that you obtain the right loan product. I will go out of my way to make sure that you have all of your questions answered and are satisfied with your loan decision prior signing any documents at the closing. Remember, you should never hesitate to ask questions. Ask whatever you need to so that you understand the entire process.

Your total satisfaction is what I aim for. Your future referrals are the cornerstone of my business. What 3 friends do you know today who are in need of a Home Loan, Business Loan or Commercial Loan, a referral from you would be fully appreciated.

I can be reached for a FREE consultation at (cell) 617-202-8069 or (703) 584-5998,



it's FREE, there is no obligation whatsover...! Sincerely, Pierre R. Augustin, MPA, MBA

Tuesday, July 24, 2007

Mortgage Fraud: In Search of Justice

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT - FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Pierre R. Augustin, Pro Se, Debtor; Pierre R. Augustin, Pro Se, Plaintiff

[vs.] ) Adversary Proceeding No: 07-04071, Chapter 7 - Case No: 05-46985

JURY DEMANDED

Defendants: Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, ) Commonwealth Land Title Insurance comp. ) (“Commonwealth”) ) Ameriquest Mortgage, et All ) Defendants )

Motion To Object To Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Based On Plaintiff-Debtor’s Timely Legal Objection Of Mortgage Fraud

Your Honor, “parties appearing pro se are allowed greater latitude with respect to reasonableness of their legal theories (Patterson V. Aiker, 111 F.R.D. 354, 358 [N.D. GA 1986])”. Also, the court is supposed to judge the case based on its merits even if procedural errors are made. Therefore, the court must give a Pro Se Plaintiff, “every favorable inference arising from his pro se status” (Hall v. Dworkin, 829 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (ND NY 1993)).

Insatiable Quest For Equal Justice
Somewhere Plaintiff-Debtor read that the greatness of America is intertwined with property rights as "the guardian of every other right". The following phrases are just one beat away from every American heart, North and South, East and West: "All men are created equal," "government by consent of the governed," "give me liberty or give me death", and “equal protection under the law” or in my situation, the pursuit for “equal justice under the law”. Well, those words, reflects the values and tradition that American have exported throughout the world in promoting democracy and freedom. Based on these principles, Americans have fought and died for two centuries. In retrospect, Martin Luther King in his infamous speech could not have said it better:

“But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. And so, we've come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice. For at the real heart of battle for equality is a deep seated belief in the democratic process. Equality depends not on the force of arms or tear gas but depends upon the force of moral right; not on recourse to violence but on respect for law and order.”

In digesting the philosophical meaning of the quote above, Plaintiff-Debtor stands today with a sense of deep humility and great assurance -- humility in the wake of those great American jurists who have stood up for righteousness; assurance in the reflection that the written words, “Equal Justice Under Law”, at the facade of the United States Supreme Court signifies equal protection, fair and balance ruling in the ‘eyes of the average citizen’.

As in the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Let not the keenness of our spirit ever be dulled. Let not the impacts of temporary events, of temporal matters of but fleeting moment let not these deter us in our unconquerable purpose” [in the search for equal justice under the law].

Plaintiff-Debtor addresses this court and the defense attorneys with neither rancor nor bitterness

despite the unwarranted deprivation of his ‘property rights‘, but with one purpose in mind, to:

[let the innerant truth carries the scales of justice, let equality depends upon the force of moral right, let the respect for law and order be the underlying principle for the fair and equal administration of justice and at last, but not least, Let the infallibility of Justice triumph!].

Plaintiff-Debtor has been in an uphill battle in asserting his rights in a field of nebulous legalities in this insatiable quest of justice as follows:

Plaintiff-Debtor states that (1) the Mortgage Fraud cause of action raised in his ‘Adversary Proceeding’ falls under the bankruptcy exemption of July 20, 2006 and (2)Section 522(l) operates to remove from the Bankruptcy estate interest that had become property of the estate in a fashion similar to abandonment under section 554 since according 11 USC 522(a)(2), it explicitly states that exemptions are to be determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed and is analogous to Christy v. Heights Fin. Corp., 101 B.R. 542 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (debtor had standing to assert Truth in Lending claim that had been exempted)..

The difference is that the “abandonment” effectuated by Section 522(l) is automatic and Plaintiff-Debtor can participate in particular litigation independent from the estate‘s trustee (In re Gulph (woods Corp. 24 C.C.C. 2d 206, 116 B.R. 423 (Bankr. Ed. Pa. 1990) which is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992).

Fundamental Basis Of Argument
Ronald Dworkin regards law as an interpretive process under which individual rights are paramount. Therefore, let us consider the following two situation by Dworkin:

1. First Quotation by Dworkin
“An impatient beneficiary under a will murder the testator. Should he be permitted to inherit?”

2. Debtor’s Contextual Analogy of First Quotation
Chase Home Finance as an impatient beneficiary strips away Plaintiff-Debtor’s property rights despite his timely legal objections and defenses. Should Chase Home Finance be permitted to inherit the profit by depriving Plaintiff-Debtor’s of his property and rights?

3. Second Quotation by Dworkin
“A chess grand master distracts his opponent by continually smiling at him. The opponent objects. Is smiling in breach of the rule of chess?”

4. Debtor’s Contextual Analogy of Second Quotation
Chase Home Finance blind folded their eyes and put their two hands over their ears by not answering to Plaintiff-Debtor’s timely legal objections and defenses by maintaining silence. Plaintiff-Debtor objects but no one is looking or listening. Is the silence of Chase Home Finance in breach of the rules of law that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff-Debtor‘s property rights?

Argument
The first quotation mentioned above by Dworkin is “drawn from the New York Decision of Riggs v. Palmer in 1899. The will in question was validly executed and was in the murderer’s favour. But whether a murderer could inherit was uncertain: the rules of testamentary succession provided no applicable exception. The murderer should therefore have a right to his inheritance. The New York Court held, however, that the application of the rules was subject to the principle that ‘no person should profit from his own wrong’. Hence, a murderer could not inherit from his victim.”

According to Dworkin, in the second quotation, “the referee is called upon to determine whether smiling is in breach of the rules of chess. The rules are silent. He must therefore consider the nature of chess as a game of intellectual skill; does this include the use of psychological intimidation? He must, in other words, find the answer that best ‘fits’ and explains the practice of chess.”

1. Affirmative Defense to Motion to Dismiss based on Force Majeure
Force majeure (French for "greater force") is a common clause in contracts which essentially frees one or both parties from liability or obligation when an extraordinary event or circumstance beyond the control of the parties, such as war, strike, riot, crime, act of God (e.g., flooding, earthquake, volcano), prevents one or both parties from fulfilling their obligations under the contract. (see memorandum in support of adversary proceeding based on psychology and the law).

2. Affirmative Defense to Motion to Dismiss based on Mortgage Fraud
The assignee of a mortgage is subject to all claims or defenses with respect to that mortgage that the consumer could have asserted against the original creditor (New Century Mortgage). One such defense against both original creditor and assignee is Civil Conspirary for committing mortgage fraud. Civil conspiracy of defendants ('The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the common design. . . . In such an action the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity'' by illegally and fraudulently assigned his deed on January 29, 2007 at the registry of Deed, (Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 44, citing Mox Incorporated v. Woods (1927) 202 Cal. 675, 677-78.)' (Id. at 511.)). Plaintiff-Debtor has alleged that the original creditor, New Century Mortgage, committed fraud in connection with the transaction. Plaintiff-Debtor can assert such fraud as a defense to the illegal foreclosure that assignee has enforced.

A note and mortgage induced by either common law or statutory fraud is voidable. See Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Isringhausen, 210 Ill. App. 3d 724, 727, 569 N.E.2d 235, 237 (4th Dist. 1991) (both fraud in the inducement and in the execution are valid defenses to action on a note); If a note and mortgage are voidable because of fraud, they do not become valid in the hands of the assignee. Plaintiff-Debtor is alleging the defense of mortgage fraud. “The rule is that an assignee of a contract takes it subject to the defenses which existed against the assignor at the time of the assignment” Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. McCormick, 30 Ill. App.3d 423, 424, 331 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1st Dist 1975). Thus, the foreclosure was not warranted on that basis.

The assignee of a mortgage knows that it is not assignable at common law but only in equity and that he takes it subject to all equities existing in favor of the mortgagor. It is therefore the duty of the assignee to inquire of the mortgagor if there is any reason why it should not be paid.”); Halla v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 412 Ill. 39, 104 N.E.2d 790 (1952); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank, 127 Ill. App.3d 535, 542 469 N.E.2d 204, 209 (1st Dist. 1983) (“It is a well established general rule that the assignee of a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage takes it subject to the same defenses that existed between the original parties to the instrument”); Schoenbrod v. Rosenthal, 36 Ill. App.2d 112, 183 N.E.2d 188 (1st Dist. 1962); Ainsworth Corp. v. Cenco Inc., 107 Ill. App.3d 435, 437 N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist.1982); Matter of Neprozatis’ Estate, 62 Ill. App.3d 563, 569, 378 N.E.2d 1345, 1349 (1st Dist. 1978)(“fraud will vitiate a contract, making it voidable at the option of the defrauded party)[citation omitted]; Cain v. Cross, 293 Ill. App.3d 255, 687 N.E.2d 1141 (5th Dist.1997).

Plaintiff-Debtor alleges that there is strong irrefutable evidence of Civil Conspiracy in committing FRAUD because he suffered injury of fact since (a) Allied (Mortgage Broker/Loan Company) fraudulently manipulated the facts on the mortgage application by (b) approving the mortgage on Appellant’s wife name despite her holding a temporary, seasonal and on call part-time employment of $80 per day that resulted in the stripping of Plaintiff-Debtor’s equity, (2) the causal connection of Allied fraudulent mortgage resulted in the civil conspiracy of amongst Allied, New Century now Chase Home Finance and Deuthsche Bank National Trust and Commonwealth via assignment in benefiting from the refinance transactions while Debtor’s debt liability surpassed his asset that contributed to Debtor’s financial dilemma. (See United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59, 71-73, 1 L. Ed. 2d 126, 77 S. Ct. 161 (1956); Heck v. Rodgers, 457 F. 2d 303, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1972).

3. Affirmative Defense to Motion to Dismiss Of Unclean Hands
Plaintiff-Debtor’s Affirmative defenses adequately alleges that New century Mortgage
committed fraud and violated both federal and state law in connection with the mortgage
transaction. For that reason, Plaintiff-Debtor has sufficiently stated a defense of unclean hands
against the assignee, Chase Home Finance and Deuthsche National Trust Company.

4. Affirmative Defense to Motion to Dismiss based on 522(l)
Since section 522(l) operates to remove from the Bankruptcy estate interest that had become property of the estate in a fashion similar to abandonment under section 554 since according 11 USC 522(a)(2) explicitly states that exemptions are to be determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, then both Plaintiff-Debtor’s property and cause of action were properly exempt (with no prejudice or bad faith)(Kaelin v Bassett (In re Kaelin), (308 F.3d, 885 (8th Cir. 2002)), allowed a debtor to amend his schedule of exemptions to claim as exempt a cause of action soon after he learned that the cause of action existed) and has standing to defend his exempted property and to assert his property rights.

5. Affirmative Defense to Motion to Dismiss Based on Deprivation of Rights
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). Congress’ desires to provide a bankrupt-debtor (Appellant) with a “fresh start” justifies the fact that under the former Bankruptcy Act (5 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶541.HH[1]-[3] (15th Ed. Rev. 2005), exempt property never became property of the estate.

Exempt property is property that the debtor can retain and therefore not available for distribution to creditors (see 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, Paragraph 521.12 (15th ed. Rev.). Plaintiff-Debtor’s claimed of exemption on his principal dwelling was not objected by neither the Trustee nor the creditors. Also, Plaintiff-Debtor’s filed to exempt his causes of action on July 3, 2006 and was granted by the Bankruptcy Court with no objection on July 20, 2006.

Consequently, those two interests ceased being property of the estate by operation of Section 522(l), when neither the Trustee nor any of the creditors filed an objection within the deadline, as soon as the deadline under Fed. R. Bank. P. 4003(b) had passed. Section 522(l), then, operates to remove from the Bankruptcy estate interest that had become property of the estate in a fashion similar to abandonment under section 554. That interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992). Thus, the asset would be treated as if the bankruptcy petition had never been filed, leaving the Debtor free to pursue the causes of action for himself.

Thus, Plaintiff-Debtor shows and alleges that (1) the Mortgage Fraud cause of action raised in his ‘Adversary Proceeding’ falls under the bankruptcy exemption of July 20, 2006 and (2) Section 522(l), then, operates to remove from the Bankruptcy estate interest that had become property of the estate in a fashion similar to abandonment under section 554. The difference is that the “abandonment” effectuated by Section 522(l) is automatic and Debtor can participate in particular litigation independent from the estate‘s trustee (In re Gulph (woods Corp. 24 C.C.C. 2d 206, 116 B.R. 423 (Bankr. Ed. Pa. 1990) which is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992). Put another way, abandonment moots any dispute about whether an asset is exempt (S. Rep. 95-989, at 75-76, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5861-62; H.R. Rep. 95-595, at 549, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6455.

6. Affirmative defense to Motion to Dismiss based on 11 USC 522(a)(2)
Because Plaintiff-Debtor’s home was sold after he filed for bankruptcy, the exemption is preserved since 522(a)(2) explicitly states that exemptions are to be determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. 11 USC 522(a)(2) fixes the exemptions as of the date of filing. (See In re Sadkin, 36 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1994)(even if exemption is without merit, failure of any party to file a timely objection results in allowance of exemption); In re Green, 31 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1994) (if no party challenges debtor’s valuation of asset claimed as fully exempt, Plaintiff-Debtor is entitled to exempt the entire asset regardless of what the value ultimately proves to be); In re Morgan-Busby, 272 B.R. 257 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (deadline for objections includes objections based on valuation of property clearly claimed as exempt).

7. Affirmative defense to Motion to Dismiss based on Exempt Property
Once property is exempt by virtue of the expiration of the deadline for objections as outlined in this motion, nothing prevents the debtor for initiating this adversary proceeding to recover his property. (Wissman v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 942 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1991) (debtors may pursue an exempt cause of action in order to recover their exemption); Ball v. Nationscredit Fin. Serv. Corp., 207 B.R. 869 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (exempt property reverts in debtor when time to object to exemptions expires); Seifert v. Selby, 125 B.R. 174 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (absent timely objection, exempt property revests in the debtor and is no longer property of the estate).

8. Affirmative Defense to Motion to Dismiss Based on Section 522(c)
An important feature of the bankruptcy exemption scheme is the continuing protection given to exempt property after the discharge. Section 522(c) provides that no creditor holding a pre-bankruptcy claim may ever execute against the property that has been claimed as exempt. The principal significance of this subsection is that even creditors holding claims that were not discharged may not reach exempt property to execute on their still-valid claims whereas Plaintiff-Debtor did timely and legally rescinded the mortgage.

Thus, if a debt is not discharged because of a false financial statement, because the debt was not listed, because of fraud or willful and malicious injury or on a student loan, the Plaintiff-Debtor may nevertheless be fully protected from execution on that debt if she has no property except the property exempted in the bankruptcy case. This provision serves the obvious purpose of ensuring that the debtor’s fresh start is not frustrated by pre-existing debts. It gives the exemptions a permanent character, protecting that minimum grubstake afforded by the exemption provisions from almost every attack arising out of the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy circumstances. (In re Farr, 278 B.R. 171 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).

9. Affirmative Defense based on the Supreme Court and Exemptions Precedents
As the Supreme Court observed in Taylor, “[d]eadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality.” Taylor v. Freedland & Konz, 503 U.S. at 644, 112 S.Ct. at 1648. Taylor honored Congress by giving effect to what it had enacted through Section 522(l) and what it had adopted through through F.R.B.P.4003(b). The Trustee and Creditors were on notice that the Plaintiff-Debtor intended to keep the property claimed as exempt. The Trustee and creditors chose not to object to Plaintiff-Debtor’s exemption of his property and cause of action which were authorized by the Bankruptcy court with no objection. Thus, there can be no fresh start unless Plaintiff-Debtor can be assured that the property he has claimed has exempt is free of subsequent efforts by the creditors to set aside and deprive that right and protection.

Plaintiff-Debtor’s amendment is analogous to the Equitable tolling which is a principle of tort law stating that a statute of limitations shall not bar a claim in cases where the Plaintiff-Debtor, despite use of due diligence, could not or did not discover the injury until after the expiration of the limitations period. "Equitable tolling allows courts to extend the statute of limitations beyond the time of expiration as necessary to avoid inequitable circumstances." Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996).

The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit in Kaelin v Bassett (In re Kaelin), (308 F.3d, 885 (8th Cir. 2002)), allowed a debtor to amend his schedule of exemptions to claim as exempt a cause of action soon after he learned that the cause of action existed is analogous to Plaintiff-Debtor acted to exempt his cause of action upon the discovery that it had to be listed in his bankruptcy schedules. Because the debtor in Kaelin acted promptly to exempt the cause of action and because the debtor had not concealed the property, the court found that no bad faith existed.

The Supreme Court unequivocally said in Taylor that the 30-day period by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b) set a clear deadline within which the trustee or another party in interest must object to an exemption claimed by the Plaintiff-Debtor. However, equally important in Taylor is a separate determination by the court: [that the property of the estate that is claimed as exempt ceases being property of the estate once the deadline passes without objection]. Thus, Section 522(l) operates to remove from the bankruptcy estate interests that had become property of the estate. Congress’ desire to provide a bankrupt debtor with a “fresh start” justifies this difference. Exempt property never became property of the estate (See generally, 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶541.HH[1]-[3], (15th Ed. Rev. 2005).

10. Affirmative Defense based on the Supreme Court and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Supreme Court has also made it clear that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply if the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state case, even if the parties were in privity (See Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1059 (2006),(Accord Mercado v. Playa Realty Corp., 2005 WL 1594306 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005).

The doctrine also does not apply if the consumer could not have raised the TIL claim in the state court proceeding (Bush v. SA Mortgage Serv. Co., 2005 WL 1155851 (E.D. La. May 9, 2005)(tax sale case; when notice of state court proceeding was allege to be constitutionally inadequate, plaintiff did not have reasonable opportunity to raise federal claim, Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable).
Plaintiff-Debtor was never a party in state court with any of the creditors nor did he ever has the opportunity to raise any defenses in state proceeding. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply if the federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, even if the claim denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which the plaintiff was a party. Once again, Plaintiff-Debtor was never a party in any state court proceedings (see In re Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 2006 WL 1525661 (N.D. ILL. May 30 2006)(granting preliminary injunction ordering creditor to preserve potential defenses to foreclosures), (Exxon Mobil Corp v. Saudi Basis Indus, Cop. 125 S. Ct. 1527 (2005)).

11. Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12 (B)(6)
A 12(b)(6) motion does not test the evidentiary sufficiency of a Plaintiff-Debtor's claim. Instead, it assumes that if the case were to go to trial, Plaintiff-Debtor would be able to prove all of the allegations in his adversary complaint. Thus, the sole question posed by a 12(b)(6) motion is whether Plaintiff-Debtor allegations are legally sufficient to allow recovery based on his ability to prove them at trial.

Even if at the time of filing, Plaintiff-Debtor lacks evidence to prove certain key allegations to be as long as the Plaintiff-Debtor believes they are "likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery..." As the Federal Rules Advisory Committee explained, "sometimes a litigant may have good reason to believe that a fact is true or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties or third persons to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation." Advisory Committee Note, 1993 Amendments, 146 F.R.D. 401, 585.

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiff-Debtor's claims for relief; therefore the motion admits, for purposes of the motion only, the factual allegations of the pleading, but asserts that those allegations cannot support any claim for relief.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, the issue is not whether the Plaintiff-Debtor will ultimately prevail but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims asserted. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

Also, if a defense of failure to state a claim is sustained under rule 12(b)(6), the pleader should usually be given the opportunity to amend the pleading to cure its deficiencies. See Moore's Federal Practices, § 12.34[5] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). In Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th cir. 2001) whereby district court erred in not only resolving disputed factual issues, but in even considering them, because motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests only legal sufficiency of claims, not factual sufficiency; Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 154 F.3d 1124, 1127-1129 (10th Cir. 1998), though pleaded theory was insufficient, facts alleged supported another theory of liability so dismissal was improper; Kelley v. Crosfield Catalysts, 135 F.3d 1202, 1204-1206 (7th Cir. 1998), dismissal reversed when Plaintiff-Debtor's allegations arguably stated claim under Family and Medical Leave Act.

12. Affirmative Defense of TILA By Way Of Recoupment
In In re Coxson, 43F.3d 189 (5th Cir. 1995), the 5th Circuit concluded That a Truth in Lending Act claim could be raised defensively by way of an adversary proceeding. Plaintiff-Debtor is reframing all his previously claims for TILA and other consumer violations by way of recoupment since they can be used to raise fraud, unfair trade practice and other damage claims emerging from the facts giving rise to the formation of the loan contract. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Sav. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 118 S. Ct/ 1408, 140 L. Ed 2d 566 (1998) (limiting Truth in Lending right of rescission by recoupment to situations where it is permitted after foreclosure by state law as in Massachusetts), see Matter of Coxson, 43 F.3d 189, 194 (5 th Cir. 1995) (allowing a debtor to bring a TILA claim for recoupment by way of adversary proceeding more than one year after the alleged violations took place); Roberson v. Cityscape Corp. (In re Roberson), 262 B.R. 312, 322 (Bankr. D. Pa. 2001) (holding that “TILA does not bar Plaintiff from raising her claim against [the lender] defensively,” Plaintiff could bring her claim by way of recoupment); Shaw v. Federal Mortg. & Inf. Corp. (In re Shaw), 178 B.R. 380 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (noting that “The right of a debtor in bankruptcy to invoke the doctrine of recoupment, as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) has been recognized again and again”); and In re Jones, 122 B.R. 246 (D. Pa. 1990) (holding that when TILA violations arise from the same transaction and is brought as a defense, TILA claim is a recoupment defense and is not barred by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d)).

13. No Judicial Estoppel
The equitable tolling principles are to be read into every federal statute of limitations unless Congress expressly provides to the contrary in clear and ambiguous language, (See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 560-61, 120 S. Ct. 1075, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (2000)). Since TILA does not evidence a contrary Congressional intent, its statute of limitations must be read to be subject to equitable tolling, particularly since the act is to be construed liberally in favor of Plaintiff.

The filing of Bankruptcy tolls or extends the rescission time since Plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy on September 26, 2005 and obtained a discharge on September 26, 2006. Also, the principle of equitable tolling does apply to TILA 3 years period of rescission since despite due diligence, Plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered the concealed fact of TILA violations in-depth and explicitly until September 17, 2006 at about 5 a.m. as in Kaelin v Bassett (In re Kaelin), (308 F.3d, 885 (8th Cir. 2002) (allowed a debtor to amend his schedule of exemptions to claim as exempt a cause of action soon after he learned that the cause of action existed). See also In re Baldwin, 307 B.R. 251 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (judicial estoppel did not apply because debtor was not aware of lender liability claim when bankruptcy filed and later promptly amended schedules), (Hoffman v. Truck Driving Academy, Inc., 777 So. 2d. failed to show it was prejudiced by debtor’s failure to disclose claims in bankruptcy).

14. Plaintiff-Debtor Made Proper Service To Ameriquest Mortgage
Under rule 5(b)(2)(B), service may be made by mail at the attorney’s or party’s “last known address”, FRCP(4)(f)(3), (see Exhibit #1, service made by U.S. Marshall at the same “last known address“) and is complete on the date of the mailing and the date of receipt is of no consequence (see Russell v. City of Milwaukee, 338 F. 3d 662, 665-667 (7th Cir. 2003). If a party is represented by multiple attorneys, serving any of the attorney is sufficient (see Buchanan v. Shenill, 51 F. 3d 227, 228 (10th Cir. 1995). For purpose of this rule, the date of mailing is the date the paper was deposited in a mailbox or delivered to the post office (see Theede v. United States Dept. of Labor, 172 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1992). Also, according to F.R.C.P. Rule 4(d)(3), “mailing a copy to the defendant” as proper service.

The use of certified mail to achieve service of process meets the requirements of Rule 7004(b) (See Exhibit #2) (see In re Ted A. Ptetros furs, Inc., 31 C.B.C. 2d 1614, 172 B.R. 170 (Bankr. E.D. N. Y. 1994). Service is complete when properly issued summons is placed in the mail together with the complaint (see In re Coforth, 33 C.B.C. 2d 985, 183 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995) according to 7004(b). Thus, the mere statement provided by Ameriquest Mortgage that the summons and complaint were not received is insufficient to rebut proof that the documents were properly mailed and therefore served (see In re Cossio, 163 B.R. 150 (B.A.P. 9th 1994), aff’d, 56 F.3d 70 (9th Cir. 1995).

CONCLUSION
1. Debtor has Standing

The bankruptcy code states that “The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section. … Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 USC 522(l). No one had objected to Plaintiff-Debtor’s claims of exemption of his property and cause of action. Until someone objects and until that objection is sustained, the property claimed exempt is exempt and is analogous to Christy v. Heights Fin. Corp., 101 B.R. 542 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (debtor had standing to assert Truth in Lending claim that had been exempted).

The creation of a bankruptcy estate does not extinguish a chapter 7 debtor’s property rights to exempt or removed property from the estate (see In re Hodes, 402 F.3d 1005, 1010 (10th Cir. 2005)(Stating that exemption is an interest of the debtor carved out of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor and thereby shielded creditors claims), (See also in re Moreira, 173 B.R. 965 (Bank. D. Mass 1994) whereby the court held that the exemption claim was enough to confer standing (11 USC 522(b) and 11 USC 522(l)). The proper balance is for the Plaintiff-Debtor’s property claimed exempt to remain in the Plaintiff-Debtor’s possession and control since the time has run out to object (Rule 4003(b)).

In reality, the trustee has no interest, economic or practical, in obtaining possession of exempt property or in assisting Plaintiff-Debtor in regaining possession of exempt property taken from him through an illegal foreclosure. Trustee need not abandon exempt property in order for it to cease being property of the estate; it is enough that Trustee does not timely object to claimed exemption (Bankruptcy, 11 USCA 541 & 544). The Plaintiff-Debtor should not be required to rely on a trustee in bankruptcy whose interest are in conflict with him to protect his statutory rights to exempt property. The Trustee and the Plaintiff-Debtor have different roles and rights in the bankruptcy process. The Plaintiff-Debtor has express statutory authority to exempt property at the time of filing the petition as described in 11 USC 522(a)(2).

A person has standing if the Bankruptcy Court order “diminishes the person’s property, increases the person’s burdens, or impairs the person’s rights.” Williams v. Marlar (In re Marlar), 267 F.3d 749, 753 n.1 (8th Cir. 2001). Please review other Memorandum on Psychology as to why Debtor could not have known of a possible cause of action existed based on the principle of 'equitable tolling'.

The mere loss of a statutory right to disclosure is an injury that gives Plaintiff-Debtor standing for Article III purposes (DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000). Also, he exempted his causes of action from the estate in good faith and no objection was filed. Thus, Plaintiff-Debtor states that (1) the ‘Mortgage Fraud’ cause of action falls under the bankruptcy exemption on July 20, 2006 and (2) Section 522(l), then, operates to remove from the Bankruptcy estate interest that had become property of the estate in a fashion similar to abandonment under section 554. The difference is that the “abandonment” effectuated by Section 522(l) is automatic and Plaintiff-Debtor can participate in particular litigation independent from the estate‘s trustee (In re Gulph (woods Corp. 24 C.C.C. 2d 206, 116 B.R. 423 (Bankr. Ed. Pa. 1990). That interpretation is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992).

Plaintiff-Debtor did claim federal and homestead exemption of his residence, thus, he has retained an interest in the dwelling. Having retained an interest, Plaintiff-Debtor is permitted to exercise his rights after the filing of petition (Ralph J Rohner and Fred H. Miller, Truth in Lending ¶8.02[2][a] (2000), (see In re Celona, 90 B.R. 104 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), (In re Melvin, 75 B.R. 952 (Bank. E.D. Pa. 1987), (In re Tucker, 74 B.R. 923 (Bank. Ed. Pa. 1987)) and Rule 6009 provides the right to prosecute and defend cases without the need for bankruptcy court approval. Thus, Plaintiff-Debtor has standing to defend exempt property or pursue exempted cause of action (see In re Kaelin, 308 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2002) (debtor could exempt recently discovered cause of action because debtor had acted promptly to amend exemptions after learning of its existence) which have ceased being property of the estate pursuant to Plaintiff-Debtor’s claim of exemption (bankruptcy code 11 USCA 522(a)(2)).

2. Debtor’s Requested Relief for Equal Justice
Plaintiff-Debtor is not looking for sympathy. Plaintiff-Debtor is not looking to be rewarded. Plaintiff-Debtor is not seeking the punishment of the defendants. However, Plaintiff-Debtor is only asking to be allowed to defend his properly exempted (with no objection) property (his home and cause of action) rights in front of a jury that that the law allows him to do in his quest to recover his property. (See Ryan Operations, Gen. P’ship v.. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996) (suit on claim not listed in bankruptcy schedules not barred by judicial estoppel, as debtor had not attempted to play fast and loose with rules and failure to list claim had no impact on bankruptcy case); (Elliot v. ITT Corp., 150 B.R. 36 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (failure to initially schedule debt as disputed or note cause of action did not estop debtors from raising consumer protection claims against creditor after those claims were discovered).

The Chase mortgage in question is fraudulent as outline above because somebody else (New Century Mortgage) did something wrong out of lack of due care, act of negligence and failure to exercise reasonable care that has not only injured the Plaintiff-Debtor, but also deprived him of his property rights. This Adversary Proceeding seeks to nullify the mortgage based on ‘Fraud’ as an equitable action and as a defensive measure against the illegal foreclosure in order for Plaintiff-Debtor to recover his exempted property. Paradoxically, a trustee has no interest, economic or practical, in obtaining possession of exempt property or in assisting a debtor in regaining possession of exempt property taken from him through an illegal foreclosure. Thus, the defendants should be responsible for their acts, not the debtor, the innocent victim of corporate financial greed and manipulation.

Your Honor, in this insatiable quest of justice, Plaintiff-Debtor moves the Court to: let the innerant and irrefutable truth of mortgage fraud resound in the conscience of man, let equality depends upon the force of moral right, let the respect for law and order be the underlying principle for the formulation of justice and at last, but not least, Let the infallibility of Justice triumph because it is [Right] in the eye of man and God.

Respectfully submitted,
Pierre R. Augustin, Pro Se, Plaintiff-Debtor, 28 Cedar Street, Lowell, MA 01852, Tel: 617-202-8069